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Abstract
Lindström’s theorem characterizes first-order logic as the most expressive among those
that satisfy the countable Compactness and downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorems.
Given the importance of this results in model theory, Lindström’s theorem justifies, to
some extent, the privileged position of first-order logic in contemporary mathematics.
Even though Lindström’s theorem gives a negative answer to the problem of finding a
proper extension of first-order logic satisfying the same model-theoretical properties, the
study of these extensions has been of great importance during the second half of the
XX. century: logicians were trying to find systems that kept a balance between expressive
power and rich model-theoretical properties. The goal of this essay is to prove Lindström’s
theorem, along with its prerequisites, and to give weaker versions of the Compactness
and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems for the logic L(Q1) (first-order logic with the quantifier
"there exist uncountably many"), which we present as an example of extended logic with
good model-theoretical properties.
Resumen
El teorema de Lindström caracteriza la lógica de primer orden como la más expresiva
entre las que cumplen los teoremas de Compacidad numerable y Löwenheim-Skolem de-
scendiente. Dada la importancia de ambos resultados en teoría de modelos, el teorema
de Lindström justifica, en cierta medida, el lugar privilegiado que otorgamos a la lógica
de primer orden en las matemáticas contemporáneas. Aunque el teorema de Lindström
ofrece una respuesta negativa al problema de encontrar extensiones propias que cumplan
las mismas propiedades que la lógica de primer orden, el estudio de estas extensiones
ha tenido una importancia considerable en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, donde se ha
tratado de encontrar sistemas lógicos que mantuvieran cierto equilibrio entre propiedades
semánticas y poder expresivo. El objetivo de este trabajo es demostrar el teorema de Lind-
ström, incluyendo sus prerrequisitos, y dar versiones débiles de los teoremas de Com-
pacidad y Löwenheim-Skolem para la lógica L(Q1) (la lógica de primer orden junto con
el cuantificador "existe una cantidad no numerable"), que presentamos como ejemplo de
extensión de la lógica de primer orden con buenas propiedades semánticas.
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Gizonen lana jakintza dugu: ezagutuz aldatzea. [...] ezaren gudaz baietza
sortuz, ukazioa legetzat hartuz beti aurrera joatea.
—Mikel Laboa, Izarren hautsa
Los problemas lógicos no son solo problemas de forma; se trata de cuestiones
ontológicas, cosmológicas y antropológicas. [...] toda forma se presenta, en
principio, como un contenido que primero se trabaja, se elabora y solo luego
deviene forma, aunque, al final del proceso, la forma parezca anterior al
contenido. ¿No es así como surge la concepción griega del cosmos elaborada
por Aristóteles en tanto que concepción del orden y de la necesidad,
transcrita en el proceso de deducción formal?
—Henri Lefebvre, Lógica formal, lógica dialéctica
Model theory is a branch of mathematical logic dedicated to the study of the relation
between a formal language and its interpretations. In particular, what is known as classical
model theory deals with the interaction of first-order logic and mathematical structures.
The work of authors such as Löwenheim, Skolem, Gödel and Malcev provided the basic
results for the subject in the first half of the XX. century, but it was not clearly visible as
a separate area of research until the early 1950’s (in fact, A. Tarski coined the term theory
of models in 1954). Since then, model theory has proven to be a rich and highly technical
subject with a wide range of applications in fields such as set theory, algebra and analysis.
Model theory often gives information about the limitations of our formal system. For
example, the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (1920) states that if a countable set
of sentences has an infinite model (that is, a model with infinite cardinality in which those
sentences are true), then it has a countable model. This means that we cannot distinguish
between countable and uncountable cardinalities in first-order logic. The Compactness
theorem (Gödel, 1930) (which states that a set of sentences is satisfiable if and only if
every finite subset is) provides similar results, and lies in the basis of the construction of
non-standard models of arithmetic, giving another interesting example of the limitations
of first-order logic: we cannot characterize natural numbers up to isomorphism within it.
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The working mathematician exceeds the limits of first-order logic every now and then,
and since mathematical logic should have a saying in how a mathematician reasons, it
was a natural step to study extensions of first-order logic that were expressive enough to
formalize that reasoning. The first of such extensions was second-order logic, where one
can quantify over subsets of the universe rather than just over elements of it. Due to all
its expressive power, second-order logic fails to satisfy the Compactness and Löwenheim-
Skolem theorems, which had slowly become two of the most widely used results in model
theory. This was not an exception. It soon became clear that there is a trade-off between
the expresive power and the model-theoretical properties of a logical system, and the task
of finding versions of the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems for extensions
of first-order logic became a real challenge.
By the 1960s, a variety of extensions had been studied, but none of them satisfied
those central theorems simultaneously. In his 1969 paper [10], the swedish logician Per
Lindström2 provided an explanation to this fact with a striking result: what currently is
known as Lindström’s first theorem states that every logic with more expressive power
than first-order logic will fail to satisfy either the Compactness theorem or the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem. More precisely, first-order logic is the strongest logic satisfying the
following properties:3
(1) (Countable Compactness) A countable set of sentences has a model if and only if
every finite subset of it has a model.
(2) (Löwenheim Property) If a sentence has an infinite model, it has a countable model.
Giving such a characterization presupposes an understanding of what a logic is. For
this purpose Lindström introduced the notion of abstract logic, which considered a logical
system to be a pair consisting of a map sending languages to sentences and a satisfaction
relation between structures and sentences. This definition, with the corresponding techni-
calities and closure properties, is general enough to include first-order logic and its main
extensions within it.
Since the Compactness theorem (and its close relative, the Completeness theorem,
which states that a set of sentences is consistent if and only if it has a model) are uncondi-
tionally needed for any strong formal language, one could think that Lindström’s theorem
upholds first-order logic as the only possible logic (as some logicians and philosophers
have argued during the XX. century). However, the importance of the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem is more controversial:
«The theorem of Lindström shows simultaneously the high stability of the
first order logic as well as its limitations. It gives a general concept of logic
and asserts that logics which apparently extend the first order logic all end
up being the same as it, provided they satisfy the Löwenheim theorem (i.e. a
sentence has a countable model if it has a model at all) and they either have the
compactness property or are formally axiomatizable. When we are interested
2A brief summary of Per Lindström’s life and work can be found in [15].
3Note that the properties listed above are weaker than the full Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theo-
rems, thus making the result stronger.
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in set theory or classical analysis, the Löwenheim theorem is usually taken as
a sort of defect (often thought to be inevitable) of the first order logic. There-
fore, what is established is not that first order logic is the only possible logic
but rather that it is the only possible logic when we in a sense deny reality to
the concept of uncountability and require (what seems to be a less debatable
condition) that logical proofs be formally checkable (viz. the requirement of
axiomatizability or compactness).» H. Wang (1974), From mathematics to philo-
sophy.
By the time Lindström published his result, there had already been enough success in
the model theory of infinitary logics and logics with cardinality quantifiers to justify their
study even at the cost of losing important model theoretical tools. In fact, a completely
new field of model theory was born with the goal of studying the relations between
different logical systems and their properties: Abstract model theory.
Abstract model theory was grounded in previous work of Mostowski (who in his
1957 paper [11] introduced a new way of extending first-order logic by adding cardinality
quantifiers), Tarski and his students (who in the late 1950s studied infinitary languages)
and Lindström. Its motivations are elocuently suggested by Barwise in [2]:
«Studying only the model theory of first-order logic would be analogous to
the study of real analysis never knowing of any but the polynomial functions:
core concepts like countinuity, differentiability, analyticity and their relations
would remain at best vaguely perceived. It is only the study of more general
functions that one sees the importance of these notions, and their different
roles, even for the simplest case.»
The analogy is quite precise. For example, the difference between full compactness
and countable compactness is not very significative in first-order applications to common
mathematical structures because their language is usually countable. In general, however,
countable compactness is much weaker. The task of finding a fully compact logic properly
extending first-order logic was carried out by Shelah in his 1975 paper [12].
Appart from studying properties of logics, abstract model theory also attempted to
give Lindström-style characterizations for them, but the project turned out to be consid-
erably difficult and only minor results were archieved.
The goal of this essay is to present two of the main results in abstract model theory: the
above mentioned Linström’s First Theorem and Keisler’s Completeness theorem for the
logic L(Q1) which has the countable Compactness theorem for L(Q1) as a consequence.
We also give a weak version of the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (down to ℵ1)
for L(Q1). The logic L(Q1) is the logic we obtain by adding the quantifier Q1 interpreted
as "there are uncountably many" to first-order logic.
It is a natural technique in abstract model theory to approximate a logic as much as we
can by first-order logic so that all our knowledge of first-order model theory is available.
Keisler’s proof is an elegant example of such technique, and this fact forces us to study
classical model theory first. For this reason, the present essay also serves as an introduction
to some foundational results and techniques in model theory, such as the back-and-forth
method, Fraissé’s theorem, elementary extensions or the omitting-types theorem.
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In accordance with its objectives, the essay is structured into two clearly distinguished
parts. The first of them covers chapters 3 and 4 and culminates with the proof of Lind-
ström’s first theorem. Chapter 3 introduces the key notions of partial and finite isomor-
phisms and the back-and-forth method in order to prove Fraissé’s theorem, which states
that two structures are elementarily equivalent if and only if they are finitely isomorphic.
Chapter 4 begins with the definition of logical system, which is very similar to Lind-
ström’s idea of abstract logic, and concludes with the proof of Lindström’s first theorem. A
brief summary of the role played by the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems is
given at the end. In the second part, that is, chapters 5 and 6, the main result is Keisler’s
completeness theorem for L(Q1). Chapter 5 deals with the first-order prerequisites for
its proof, namely, elementary extensions (especially the elementary chain theorem) and
the omitting types theorem. Chapter 6 introduces the basic semantics of the language
L(Q1). The key notion of weak model is highlighted because of its role in the proof of
the Completeness theorem, and since the Completeness theorem needs a deductive calcu-
lus, we give a concrete set of axioms. Finally, the Completness theorem is proved using
elementary chains of weak models that omit certain sets of sentences.
The essay begins with a brief review of the basic definitions in model theory, and both
the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems are proved. Chapter 2 is intended to
have a quick glance at the basic examples of extended logics, thus giving a motivation
for the incoming chapters and providing concrete examples of how expressive power and
model-theoretical properties interact.
We mention the sources used in the beginning of each chapter, but the fundamental
bibliographical sources have been [5], [8], [4] and [2]. The remaining references have been
used as secondary bibliography, and the papers mentioned, althought carefully read, are
just referenced for historical reasons. Needless to say, the present essay merely aspires to
be a systematic exposition and a synthesis of the different sources we use, but, as far as




In this chapter we introduce all the fundamental definitions and results that are rec-
quiered afterwards. Good sourcebooks for the topics treated here are [4], [5] and [7].
A language S is a set of relation, function and constant symbols. We use the letters
R, S, T..., f , g, h... and c, d, e... for them, respectively. We also use x1, ..., xn, y, z... to denote
variables. Given a language, the terms are particular string of symbols:
1. A variable is a term.
2. A constant symbol is a term.
3. If f is a n-ary function symbol and t1, . . . , tn are terms, f (t1, ..., tn) is a term.
The atomic formulas are defined in a similar way:
1. If t1, t2 are terms, t1 = t2 is atomic.
2. If R is a n-ary relation symbol and t1, ..., tn are terms, then Rt1, ..., tn is atomic.
Finally, in first-order logic with equality, Lωω, the formulas of the language S constitute
the least set LSωω such that every atomic formula belongs to LSωω and whenever ϕ, ψ ∈ LSωω
and v is a variable, ϕ∧ψ, ¬ϕ and ∃vϕ all belong to LSωω. Note that we have not mentioned
∀, →, ∨ and ↔ in our definition. They can obviously be defined in terms of ∧, ∃ and ¬
following the standard derivations. We are going to use this kind of reasoning when
carrying out an inductive argument.
We now define by induction the function SF, which assigns to each formula the set of
its subformulas:
Definition 1.1. (a) SF(ϕ) = {ϕ} if ϕ is atomic.
(b) SF(¬ϕ) = {¬ϕ} ∪ SF(ϕ).
(c) SF(ϕ ∗ ψ) = {ϕ ∗ ψ} ∪ SF(ϕ) ∪ SF(ψ) for ∗ = ∧,∨,→,↔.
(d) SF(∀xϕ) = {∀xϕ} ∪ SF(ϕ).
(e) SF(∃xϕ) = {∃xϕ} ∪ SF(ϕ).
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We use the notation |A| to represent the cardinality of the set A. It is easy to prove,
using basic properties of cardinal numbers, that |LSωω | = ω + |S|.
We now define the central notion of structure (or model).
Definition 1.2. An structure A in LSωω consists on a nonempty set (a universe) A where to each
n-ary relation symbol R ∈ S corresponds a n-ary relation RA ⊆ An, to each n-ary function
symbol f ∈ S corresponds a function fA : An → A and to every constant symbol c ∈ S
corresponds a distinguished element cA ∈ A. This correspondence is given by a interpretation γ
mapping symbols of S to their corresponding relation, function or element. Thus a S-model is a
pair A = (A, γ) composed by a universe, A, and the interpretation of S in that universe.
Remark 1.3. We usualy write RA instead of γ(R) for the interpretations of the symbols,
so we may omit γ when convenient. If the language is finite, say
S = {R1, ..., Rn, f1, ..., fm, c1, ..., cs},
we can write the model as








1 , ..., c
A
s ).
When the model is know, we may also omit the superindexes. For example, the natural
numbers with the usual order relation are (ω,<). To simplify the notation, we assume
that the universes of the structures A and B are A and B respectively.
Definition 1.4. Let S ⊆ S′ be languages and A and B S and S′-structures respectively. If A = B
and they interpret the symbols of S in the same way, then we say that B is an expansion of A.
Conversely, we say that A is the restriction of B to S (written A = B|S).
We say that a variable x in a formula ϕ is bounded if it is under the scope of an
existential or universal quantifier. Otherwise we say it is free in ϕ. A formula without free
variables is a sentence. For example, in the formula ∀x0(x0 = x1), x0 is bounded and x1 is
free. We use ϕ(x1, ...xn) to denote that the free variables of ϕ are among x1, ..., xn.
Definition 1.5. Let A be an S-structure. An interpretation of the variables in A is a function
π : VAR → A where VAR is the set of all variables and π assigns an element of A to each one.
The denotation of a term t in A under an interpretation π is tA[π] ∈ A defined as follows:
1. xA[π] = π(x) for every variable x.
2. cA[π] = cA for every constant c ∈ S.
3. f (t1, ..., tn)A[π] = fA(tA1 [π], ..., t
A
n [π]), for every n-ary function symbol f and terms
t1, ..., tn.
We now define the central notion of satisfaction, which gives meaning to the idea of a
formula being true in a structure.
Definition 1.6. Given an S-structure A and a formula ϕ ∈ LSωω, we define A |= ϕ[π] (where π
is an interpretation of the variables in A) by induction on formulas:
(a) A |= t1 = t2[π] if and only if tA1 [π] = tA2 [π].
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(b) A |= Rt1, ..., tm[π] if and only if (tA1 [π], ..., tAm [π]) ∈ RA.
(c) A |= ¬ϕ[π] if and only if A 6|= ϕ[π].
(d) A |= ϕ∧ψ[π] if and only if A |= ϕ[π] and A |= ψ[π]. There are analogue clauses for ϕ∨ψ
and ϕ→ ψ.
(e) A |= ∃xϕ[π] if and only if A |= ϕ[πax] for some a ∈ A, where πax is the interpretation in
which πax(x) = a and πax = π for the rest of variables.
(f) A |= ∀xϕ[π] if and only if A |= ϕ[πax] for all a ∈ A.
When A |= ϕ[π] we say that A satisfies ϕ with the interpretation π.
A set of formulas Σ ⊂ LSωω is said to be satisfiable if there is an S-structure A such that
A |= σ[π] for some interpretation π and every σ ∈ Σ. When Σ is a set of sentences, we say
that A is a model of Σ. In that sense, we define ModS(Σ) as the class of all the S-structures
that are a model of Σ.
Now we can also speak about consequence relation between formulas: let Σ ⊆ LSωω
and ϕ ∈ LSωω. We say that Σ |= ϕ when for every S-structure A and every interpretation
π, if A |= Σ[π] then A |= ϕ[π].
If t = t(x1, ..., xn), tA[π] is determined by the value of π in x1, ..., xn, so any two
interpretations that coincide in x1, ..., xn will result in the same tA[π]. In these cases we
write tA[a1, ..., an] to indicate that we use any denotation that sends xi to ai for i ≤ n.
The same happens with formulas: if ϕ = ϕ(x1, ..., xn), then A |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] will mean
A |= ϕ[π] with any interpretation sending xi to ai for i ≤ n. For sentences we can just
write A |= ϕ.
In the following we define the central notion of elementary equivalence:
Definition 1.7. Let A and B S-structures. We say that A and B are elementarily equivalent (and
write A ≡ B) if for every sentence ϕ ∈ LSωω, A |= ϕ iff B |= ϕ.
We now turn to results regarding homomorphisms between structures.
Definition 1.8. Let A and B be S-structures. A map F : A → B is a homomorphism if the
following conditions hold:
(a) F(cA) = cB for every constant c ∈ S.
(b) F( fA(a1, ..., an)) = fA(F(a1), ..., F(an)) for every n-ary function symbol f ∈ S and every
a1, ..., an ∈ A.
(c) (a1, ..., an) ∈ RA implies (F(a1), ..., F(an)) ∈ RB for every n-ary relation symbol R ∈ S
and every a1, ..., an ∈ A.
This definition generalizes the idea of morphism in any algebraic structure. When F is
a bijection we have an isomorphism and we write F : A ∼= B.
The following lemma shows that isomorphic structures cannot be distinguished by
means of first order sentences.
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Lemma 1.9. If F : A ∼= B, then for ϕ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω and a1, ..., an ∈ A, A |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] iff
B |= ϕ[F(a1), ..., F(an)].
Proof. The proof is a rutinary but tedious induction over formulas, it can be found, for
example, in [5] III. 5.2.
From the particular case of sentences in the previous lemma, we infer the following:
Corollary 1.10. If A ∼= B then A ≡ B.
We have seen that isomorphic structures satisfy the same sentences. Conversely, one
could ask whether structures in which the same sentences hold are isomorphic. A coun-
terexample is easy to find: Let (R,<) and (Q,<) where < is the usual order relation.
They satisfy the same L{<}ωω sentences but they are trivially not isomorphic.
The program of giving an algebraic characterization of elementary equivalence goes
back to Tarski. In the Princeton University Bicentennial Conference on Problems of Math-
ematics of 1946 (see [13]) he stated:
Algebras exist which are not isomorphic, but which cannot be distinguished by
their arithmetic properties; it would be desirable to construct a theory of arithmetic
equivalence of algebras as deep as the notions of isomorphism, etc. now in use.
The task of finding an algebraic criterion for elementary equivalence, where isomor-
phisms failed, was first carried out by Fraïssé in 1955 with the characterization we show
in chapter 3, and Ehrenfeucht independently discovered it in game form in 1961. Since
them, plenty of work has been done in this direction (see [13], footnote 46).
Definition 1.11. Let A and B be S-structures. A is a substructure of B (written A ⊆ B) if
1. A ⊆ B.
2. cA = cB for every c ∈ S.
3. For every n-ary function symbol f ∈ S, fA is the restriction of fB to An.
4. For every n-ary relation symbol R ∈ S, RA = RB ∩ An.
In this case we also say that B is an extension of A. For example, (Z,+, 0) is an exten-
sion of (ω,+, 0) (observe that (ω,+, 0) is a substructure of (Z,+, 0) but not a subgroup).
If A ⊆ B then A is S-closed in B, that is, A is nonempty, for n-ary f ∈ S, a1, ..., an ∈ A
implies fB(a1, ..., an) ∈ A and cB ∈ A for c ∈ S.
Conversely, every S-closed subset X ⊆ B corresponds to the domain of exactly one
substructure of B determined by the conditions in the definition above. We denote this
substructure by [X]B, the substructure of B generated by X.
The following two lemmas give the relation between satisfaction and substructures:
Lemma 1.12. Let A and B be S-structures with A ⊆ B. If π is an interpretation in A, then for
every quantifier-free formula ϕ ∈ LSωω we have A |= ϕ[π] iff B |= ϕ[π].
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Proof. The result is an easy induction, it can be found in [3], Proposition 4.3
We say that a formula ϕ(y1, ..., yn) is universal if it is of the form
∀x1...∀xmψ(x1, ..., xm, y1, ..., yn),
where ψ is quantifier-free.
Lemma 1.13. Let A and B be S-structures with A ⊆ B and ϕ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω a universal
formula. Then for all a1, ..., an ∈ A,
if B |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] then A |= ϕ[a1, ..., an].
Proof. The result follows from the previous lemma: If B |= ∀x1...∀xmψ(x1, ..., xm, a1, ..., an),
then for all b1, ..., bm ∈ B (and since A ⊆ B, for all b1, ..., bm ∈ A), B |= ψ[b1, ..., bm, a1, ..., an],
and by Lemma 1.12, A |= ∀x1...∀xmψ[x1, ..., xm, a1, ..., an].
1.1. Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems
As we said in the introduction, model theory has a lot to do with the limitations of
our language. In the case of first-order logic, we already mentioned that we cannot distin-
guish between countable and uncountable cardinalities due to the downward Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem. In the words of Wilfrid Hodges:
«Ravens, so we read, can only count up to seven. They can’t tell the dif-
ference between two numbers greater than or equal to eight. First-order logic
is much the same as ravens, except that the cutoff point is rather hight: it’s ω
instead of 8.» Wilfrid Hodges, Model theory
An explanation for this fact is given by the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem the-
orems, which play a determinant role in the semantics of first-order logic and are widely
applied to the study of mathematical structures. Not only are these theorems important,
but, as Lindström proved, they characterize first-order logic. For these reasons they are
considered the two basic results in the model theory of first-order logic. We also apply
them to prove the existence of non-standard models of arithmetic.
The classical approach to the Compactness theorem is to have it as a corollary of the
Completeness theorem. Model theorists tend to prefere direct proofs independent from
the deductive calculus, for instance, using the set theoretical tools of filters and ultrafilters.
The proof we give here follows the classical proof method of Henkin but using the shortcut
in Lemma 1.16 to avoid Completeness theorem (see [3]).
Definition 1.14. Let Σ be a set of LSωω sentences. We say that Σ is finitely satisfiable if every
finite subset of Σ is satisfiable.
Obviously, the reciprocal is always true: if a set of sentences is satisfiable then every
finite subset is satisfiable too.
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Definition 1.15. Let C ⊆ S be a set of constants. We say that Σ has witnesses in C when for
every formula ϕ(x) ∈ LSωω such that ∃xϕ(x) ∈ Σ there is c ∈ C with ϕ(c) ∈ Σ.
The idea of Henkin’s proof of the Compactness Theorem is to construct a model of Σ
whose universe is C.
Lemma 1.16. Let S be a language and C a set of constants such that S∩C = ∅ and |C| = |S|+ω.
Then there is a set of sentences ∆ ⊆ LS∪Cωω such that:
(a) If Σ is a finitely satisfiable set of LSωω-sentences, then Σ ∪ ∆ is finitely satisfiable.
(b) If Γ ⊇ ∆ is a set of sentences in S ∪ C closed under modus ponens (that is, ϕ ∈ Γ and
ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ imply that ψ ∈ Γ), then Γ has witnesses in C.
Proof. Let κ = |C| = |S|+ ω and C = {ci | i < κ}. Since every sentence has a finite number
of symbols, we can give an enumeration, (ϕi | i < κ), of the formulas with a single free
variable in LS∪Cωω , so that for every i < κ, ϕi = ϕi(xi) is a S ∪ {cj | j < i}-formula.
We now define ∆ = {(∃xi ϕ(xi)→ ϕi(ci)) | i < κ}. It is clear that this ∆ already satisfies
(b). We turn to the proof of (a).
Consider a finitely satisfiable set of S-sentences Σ. For each α ≤ κ, let ∆α = {(∃xi ϕ(xi)→
ϕi(ci)) | i < α}. We will prove by induction that for every α ≤ κ Σ ∪ ∆α is finitely satisfi-
able.
When α = 0 or the result is trivial, and using induction hypothesis we also know that
the result holds when α is a limit cardinal. Now suppose Σ ∪ ∆α is finitely satisfiable. We
know that Σ ∪ ∆α+1 = Σ ∪ ∆ ∪ {∃xα ϕα(xα) → ϕα(cα)}, and since Σ ∪ ∆α and ∃xα ϕα(xα)
are S ∪ {ci | i < α}-sentences, in every model of Σ ∪ ∆ we can always interpret cα in a way
that satisfies the conditional, so the result is proved.
Lemma 1.17 (Lindenbaum). Let Σ be a finitely satisfiable set of sentences. Then Σ can be
extended to a maximal set with respect to finite satisfiability.
Proof. A simple application of Zorn’s Lemma.
Lemma 1.18. Let Σ be a maximal set of sentences with respect to finite satisfiability with witnesses
in C ⊆ S. Then Σ has model A with A = {cA | c ∈ C}.
Proof. Consider the set T of terms without variables. We define the following relation in
T:
t1 ∼ t2 iff t1 = t2 ∈ Σ.
Since Σ is maximal, ∼ is en equivalence relation in T and the following hold:
(a) If f is an n-ary function symbol and ti ∼ t′i for i < n, then f (t1, ..., tn) ∼ f (t′1, ..., t′n).
(b) If R is an n-ary relation symbol, Rt1, ..., tn ∈ Σ and ti ∼ t′i for i < n, then Rt′1, ..., t′n ∈
Σ.
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We will now construct a model A whose universe is A = T∼ = {[t]∼ | t ∈ T}, the
equivalence classes of the relation ∼ in T. The interpretations of the symbols in it are the
following:
1. For each c ∈ S, cA = [c]∼.
2. For every n-ary function symbol f ∈ S and arbitrary t1, ..., tn ∈ T, fA([t1]∼, ..., [tn]∼) =
[ f (t1, ..., tn)]∼.
3. For every n-ary relation symbol R ∈ S and arbitrary t1, ..., tn ∈ T, ([t1]∼, ..., [tn]∼) ∈
RA iff Rt1, ..., tn ∈ Σ.
Let a ∈ A. Then there is t ∈ T such that a = [t]∼ and since Σ |= ∃xx = t, ∃xx = t ∈ Σ.
As Σ has witnesses in C, there is c ∈ C with c = t ∈ Σ, whence c ∼ t. This means that
a = [c]∼ = cA, thus A = {cA | c ∈ C}.
Now we will prove by induction that A is a model of Σ. It is easy to see that for each
t ∈ T, tA = [t]∼ and using (b) we can prove that for each atomic sentence ϕ ∈ LSωω, A |= ϕ
iff ϕ ∈ Σ. For ¬ϕ and ϕ ∨ ψ, the maximality of Σ gives the same result, so we turn to
consider the case ∃xϕ(x).
Since A = {cA | c ∈ C}, A |= ∃xϕ(x) if and only if there is c ∈ C such that A |= ϕ(c).
As C is a set of witnesses for Σ, ∃xϕ(x) ∈ Σ iff there is c ∈ C such that ϕ(c) ∈ Σ, and
applying the induction hypothesis to ϕ(c) we have the desired result.
We finally prove the Compactness Theorem for Lωω:
Theorem 1.19 (Compactness Theorem). Let S be a language and Σ a finitely satisfiable set of
sentences in LSωω, then Σ is satisfiable (in a model of cardinality ≤ |S|+ ω).
Proof. Let κ = |S| + ω and consider C a set of constants with C ∩ S = ∅ and |C| = κ.
Let ∆ be the set of sentences given by Lemma 1.16. Then Σ ∪ ∆ will be finitely satisfiable.
Consider the extension Σ∪ ∆ ⊆ Γ given by Lemma 1.17. By Lemma 1.18, Γ has a model A
with A = {cA | c ∈ C}, hence |A| ≤ κ. Then A|S satisfies Σ in the language S.
If one reexamines the precedent proof, we can obtain the following result:
Theorem 1.20 (Downward Löwenheim-Skolem). Let Σ be a satisfiable set of S-sentences. Then
Σ has a model A of cardinality |A| ≤ |LSωω | = |S|+ ω.
In particular, if Σ is countable, then it will only depend on countably many sym-
bols, S0 ⊆ S, so Σ ⊂ LS0ωω and hence has a model of cardinality ≤ ω. The Downward
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is usually stated for this particular case.
Although it will not be used in the future, we prove, for the sake of completeness, the
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem:
Theorem 1.21 (Upward Löwenheim-Skolem). Let Σ be a set of satisfiable S-sentences with an
infinite model. Then for each cardinal κ ≥ |S|+ ω, there is a model of Σ with cardinality κ.
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Proof. Let κ ≥ |S|+ ω and consider C = {ci | i < κ} a new set of constant symbols such
that C ∩ S = ∅ and ci 6= cj for i 6= j. Let Γ = Σ ∪ {¬ci 6= cj | i < j < κ}. Since
Σ has an infinite model, Γ is finitely satisfiable (giving the proper interpretation to the
new constants in the old model), and by the compactness theorem, Γ has a model A of
cardinality ≤ |S ∪ C|+ ω ≤ κ. But since A |= ¬ci = cj for every i 6= j < κ, the cardinality
of A has to be exactly κ. Then A|S is a model of Σ with cardinality κ in the language S.
The existence of non-standard models of arithmetic is an interesting consequence of
the results in this section. Let N = (ω, σ, 0) be the standard structure of the natural
numbers. A non standard model of arithmetic is an structure which satisfies Th(N) =
{ϕ ∈ LSωω |N |= ϕ} but which is not isomorphic to N.
Consider S = {σ, 0} and the standard structure of the natural numbers N = (ω, σ, 0)
where σ is the usual successor function.. We can expand the language with a new constant
c and consider the set of sentences in LS∪{c}ωω , Γ = Th(N) ∪ {c 6= 0} ∪ {c 6= σ0} ∪ {c 6=
σσ0}.... Obviously, every finite subset of the previous set is satisfiable, because we can
take a model which is the same as N and interprets c as σNn where n is the biggest
natural such that c 6= n appears in the subset. (Recall that we use n as an abbreviation
for (σ . . .︸︷︷︸
n times
σ0)N). Hence every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable and by the Compactness
theorem, Γ itself has a model M. Since Th(N) ⊂ Γ, M |= Th(N), thus we have a non-
standard model of arithmetic:
Suppose f : N → M is an isomorphism. Then there is n ∈ N such that f (n) = cM.
But in that case f (σN(n− 1)) = σN( f (n− 1)) = cM, in contradiction with the sentence
c 6= σ( f (n− 1)) ∈ Γ.
Another way of obtaining a non-standard model of arithmetic is to use the upward
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem: since Th(N) is satisifable and infinite, it has models of every
cardinality κ > ω, and those models are trivially not isomorphic to N.
As we have just seen, we cannot characterize natural numbers up to isomorphism
in first-order logic. This seems a drawback of our formal language, but experience has
shown that non-standard models are of great mathematical interest. In fact, non-standard
analysis can be built with similar techniques, blurring the line between desired and unde-
sired results in logic and suggesting that we should not try to avoid those limitations of
the formal method but to learn as much as possible from them.
8
Chapter 2
Extensions of first-order logic
In the following we present three basic examples of logical systems which extend first-
order logic in some way. For now, the very notions of logical system or extension of a logic
will remain vague, but a proper definition will be given in Chapter 4. The basic idea is
that a logical system is just bunch of rules to build sentences and formulas out of symbols
and a satisfaction relation that tells whether a sentence is true in a model or not.
Extensions of first-order logic started to gain popularity in the mid-1950s with the
works of Mostowski, Henkin, Tarski and many others who tried to obtain logical systems
with more expresive power than Lωω, in many occasions for applications in algebra. 1
The task of finding an extension satisfying the same basic model-theoretical properties
as Lωω soon became very difficult. The systems we briefly survey here are intended to
give a glance of how these systems are valuable for mathematical purposes and how they
fail to satisfy Compactness and (downward) Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, hence giving
a motivation for Lindström’s (first) theorem. The main references for this chapter are [5]
and [2].
2.1. Second-order logic
Second-order logic differs from first-order logic in the fact that in the former one can
quantify over second-order objects such as subsets of the domain of a structure or n-ary
relations and functions. In the following we present the basic syntax and semantics of the
second-order language LI I .
Let S be a language. In adition to the symbols of LSωω, LSII will contain, for each n ≥ 1,
countable many n-ary relational variables Xn0 , X
n
1 , ....
1"The continuous development of infinitary logic that began in 1954 was part of a broader effort during the
mid-1950s to extend first-order logic to logics that hopefully retained valuable features of first-order logic but
had greater expressive power (e.g. weak second-order logic, generalized quantifiers). Foremost among those
features was completeness (every valid sentence is provable) and strong completeness (every consistent set of
sentences has a model). Yet the work of Henkin and Tarski (and their students Karp and Scott) in the mid-1950s
was motivated at first by algebraic concerns and especially by Boolean algebras, sometimes with additional
operators (e.g. cylindric algebras)." Moore G.H. (1997) The Prehistory of Infinitary Logic: 1885-1955. pg. 105.
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We define the set LSII of second-order S-formulas to be the set generated with the
syntax for first-order formulas extended by the following rules:
(a) If X is an n-ary relational variable and t1, ..., tn are S-terms, then Xt1, ..., tn is and
S-formula.
(b) If ϕ is an S-formula and X is a relational variable, then ∃Xϕ is an S-formula.
We now extend the satisfaction relation from Lωω by taking into account (a) and (b):
If A is an S-structure, γ a second-order assignment in A (a map sending each variable x
to an element of A and each n-ary relational variable Xn to an n-ary relation on A) and
J = (A, γ), then we set:
(a) J |= Xt1, ..., tn iff (tA1 [γ], ..., tAn [γ]) ∈ γ(X).
(b) For n-ary X, J |= ∃Xϕ iff there is C ⊆ An such that J( CX ) |= ϕ, where (
C
X ) entails the
substitution of C in every free occurence of X in ϕ.
We use LI I to denote second-order logic. Note that we can also use and quantify
function variables, since we can make them relational taking their graph.
Remark 2.1. Arithmetic can be properly stated in second-order logic: let S = {σ, 0} where
σ is a unary function and 0 a constant. Then we have the following LSII-axioms (these are
the classical Peano axioms):
(a) ∀x¬σx = 0,
(b) ∀x∀y(σx = σy→ x = y),
(c) ∀X((X0∧ ∀x(Xx → Xσx))→ ∀yXy).
It is a theorem by Dedekind that every two Peano structures (structures satisfying Peano’s
axioms) are isomorphic, so we have that, unlike in first-order logic, we can character-
ize natural numbers up to isomorphisms. Note that the fact that we can write down
the induction axiom (c), prevents us from constructing a non-standard model using the
Compactness theorem as we did in the previous chapter.
Another advantage of LI I is that we can characterize finiteness with it. Let g be an
unary function variable and ϕfin := ∀g(∀x∀y(gx = gy → x = y) → ∀x∃yx = gy).
A |= ϕfin iff every injective function from A to A is surjective, that is, A |= ϕfin iff A is
finite.
This kind of expressive power regarding infinity usually suggests that the Compactness
theorems fail:
Theorem 2.2. The Compactness theorem does not hold for LI I .
Proof. Consider the sentences ϕ≥n = ∃x1...∃xn(x1 6= x2 ∧ ... ∧ x1 6= xn ∧ ... ∧ xn−1 6= xn)
for each n ∈ ω. A |= ϕ≥n if and only if A has more than n elements. Then the following
set of sentences works as a counterexample for the theorem:
{ϕfin} ∪ {ϕ≥n | n ≥ 2}.
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Using a similar argument, we can prove the following:
Theorem 2.3. The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold for Lωω.
Proof. We give a sentence ϕunc such that for all structures A, A |= ϕunc iff A is uncountable.
Then ϕunc will be satisfiable but will not have any countable model.
We first define a formula ψfin(X) with unary X such that (A, γ) |= ψfin(X) iff γ(X) is
finite: ψfin(X) :=
∀g(∀x∀y((Xx ∧ Xy ∧ Xgx ∧ Xgy ∧ gx = gy)→ x = y)→ ∀x(Xx → ∃y(Xy ∧ x = gy))).
Note that ψfin(X) is the relativization of ϕfin to X. We know that a set A is at most
countable iff there is a total order on A such that every element has only finitely many
predecessors, so we define, using a binary relation variable Y, ϕ≤ctbl := ∃Y(∀x¬Yxx ∧
∀x∀y∀z((Yxy ∧ Yyz) → Yxz) ∧ ∀x∀y(Yxy ∨ x = y ∨ Yyx) ∧ ∀x∃X(ψfin(X) ∧ ∀y(Xy ↔
Yyx))). Then we have A |= ϕ≤ctbl iff A is at most countable and hence we can set ϕunc :=
¬ϕ≤ctbl.
As we have seen, second-order logic sacrifices many good model theoretical properties
in favour of great expressive power, but the lack of any kind of Compactness theorem
makes it difficult to handle for mathematical purposes. For these reasons logicians usually
study weaker versions of second-order logic where some analogue of the Compactness
theorem holds.
2.2. Infinitary logic
Another natural way of extending first-order logic is to allow formulas of infinite
lenght, in particular, infinite disjunctions and conjunctions. These logics are called in-
finitary logics. We now present the system Lω1ω where only countable conjunctions and
disjunctions are allowed.
Let S be a language. We add the symbol
∨
for infinite (countable) disjunctions. We
define the set LSω1ω to be the set generated by the rules of first-order formulas extended
with the following:
If Φ is an at most countable set of S-formulas, then
∨
Φ is an S-formula.
We define satisfaction relation for
∨
with the following clause: A |= ∨Φ if and only if
A |= ϕ for some ϕ ∈ Φ.
Remark 2.4. Obviously, the infinite conjunction can be defined in the natural way:∧
Φ := ¬∨¬Φ, where ¬Φ := {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}.
As in second order logic, we can characterize natural numbers up to isomorphism
with the first two Peano Axioms in Remark 2.1 and the sentence
∀x
∨
{x = σ · · · σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-times
0 | n ≥ 0}.
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Theorem 2.5. The Compactness theorem does not hold for Lω1ω
Proof. Consider the sentence ψfin :=
∨{¬ϕ≥n | n ≥ 2}. The set of sentences {ψfin} ∪
{ϕ≥n | n ≥ 2} is a counterexample.
The lack of a strict analogue for the Compactness theorem makes the model theory of
infinitary logics weaker, but one can still transfer results from first-order logic by taking
into account the set theoretical issues derived from the fact that we are dealing with
infinitely long formulas. See, for example, the Barwise Compactness Theorem for Lω1ω in
[9].
The definition of the set of subformulas of ϕ ∈ Lω1ω is obtained adding the clause
SF(
∨
Φ) := {∨Φ} ∪⋃ψ∈Φ SF(ψ) to the first-order ones.
Lemma 2.6. Let S be at most countable, ϕ and LSω1ω-sentence and B an S-structure such that
B |= ϕ. Then there is an at most countable substructure A ⊆ B with A |= ϕ.
Proof. We define a sequence A0, A1, ... of at most countable subsets of B so that for m ∈ ω,
(a) A0 ⊇ {cB | c ∈ S}.
(b) Am ⊆ Am+1.
(c) For ψ(x1, ..., xn, x) ∈ SF(ϕ) or ψ = ( f x1 . . . xn = x) (with n-ary f ∈ S) and a1, ..., an ∈
Am, if B |= ∃xψ[a1, ..., an] then there is an a ∈ Am+1 such that B |= ψ[a1, ..., an, a].
Suppose Am is already defined and is at most countable. In order to construct Am+1,
for every formula ψ(x1, ..., xn, x) ∈ SF(ϕ) or which has the form f x1 . . . xn = x (with
n-ary f ∈ S) and a1, ..., an ∈ Am with B |= ∃xψ[a1, ..., an] we choose b ∈ B such that
B |= ψ[a1, ..., an, b]. Let A′m the set of b’s chosen this way. Since SF(ϕ) and Am are
countable so is A′m. Then Am+1 = Am ∪ A′m. Now we set A :=
⋃
m∈ω Am. We have:
Obviously A is (at most) countable and S-closed, so A is the domain of an at most
countable substructure A of B. Now it is straightforward to prove by induction that for
all ψ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ SF(ϕ) and a1, ..., an ∈ A, A |= ψ[a1, ..., an] iff B |= ψ[a1, ..., an]. Then
A |= ϕ.
Since for every Lω1ω-sentence there is an at most countable S such that ϕ ∈ LSω1ω, we
already have Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for Lω1ω:
Theorem 2.7. Every satisfiable Lω1ω-sentence (or countable set of sentences) has an at most
countable model.
2.3. Cardinality quantifiers
Cardinality quantifiers were first suggested by Mostowski [11] in 1957 in the frame-
work of his more general concept of generalized quantifiers, and they significantly expand
the expressive power of the language. We focus on the most basic example: the logic
L(Q0), where Q0xϕ means "there are infinitely x satisfying ϕ".
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Let α be an ordinal and consider the first-order logic Lωω with identity. We form the
logic L(Qα) by adding to Lωω a new quantifier Qαx which will be interpreted as "there
are ℵα many x"2. Then we add the rule
If ϕ(x) is a formula then so is Qαxϕ.
The satisfaction relation is expanded in the natural way. Let ϕ(x, x1..., xn) be a LS(Qα)-
formula and a1, ..., an ∈ A. Then
A |= Qαxϕ[a1, ..., an] iff |{b ∈ A |A |= ϕ[b, a1, ..., an]}| ≥ ℵα.
Now, we turn to the particular system L(Q0). This logic builds in the finite/infinite
distinction missing from first-order logic. Consider the set
Γ = {¬Q0xx = x} ∪ {ϕ≥n | n ≥ 2}.
It is clear that every finite subset is satisfiable, but Γ itself is not, hence the Compactness
theorem does not hold in L(Q0).
However, Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does hold: we just have to use the argument of
Lemma 2.6 and make a similar construction taking countably many elements into Am+1
whenever we have B |= Q0xϕ[a1, ..., an], with a1, ..., an ∈ Am.
Furthermore, the structure of natural numbers can also be axiomatized in this logic, the
only difference with respect to previous examples is that we have to expand our language
to include the usual order relation.
Indeed, the following axioms, along with (a) and (b) in Remark 2.1, characterize
(ω, σ, 0,<) up to isomorphism:
∀x¬Q0y(y < x)
∀x∀y(x < y↔ σ(x) < σ(y))
∀x(x 6= 0→ 0 < x)
∀x∀y(x < y↔ (σ(x) = y ∨ σ(x) < y))
"< is a linear order without last element".
The incompactness of L(Q0) is a great disadvantage, and it turns the system quite
useless for mathematical purposes. For that reason, model theorists have headed their
attention to better behaving extensions such as L(Q1) which we present in Chapter 6.
L(Q0) remains as an example of a natural logic which turns out to be unsatisfactory.
2In the standard representation of infinite cardinals, ℵα represents the α-th infinite cardinal. For example, ℵ1




An algebraic characterization of
elementary equivalence
We now introduce partial isomorphisms and the back-and-forth method, a well sta-
blished technique in model theory that constitutes the basis for the algebraic character-
ization of elementary equivalence we seek. The main result of the chapter is, therefore,
Fraïsse’s theorem, which states that for two structures A and B, being elementarily equiva-
lent is tantamount to being isomorphic in a sense we introduce in 3.1. This result provides
us with a new way to disprove the elementary equivalence between two structures with-
out any reference to first-order language. This approach will be very useful in the proof
of Lindström’s theorem.
In the first subsection we present all the theoretical machinery we need for Fraïssé’s
theorem, including the key notions of two structures being finitely (partially) isomorphic,
and in 3.2 we give a complete proof.
The entire chapter follows the spirit of [5]. For a classical discussion of the back-and-
forth method and some of its consequences, see [1].
3.1. Partial isomorphisms and back-and-forth
Cantor was the first to understand that partial isomorphisms can be extended to an
isomorphism provided the structures in which they are defined are countable. Using this
idea, he proved that any two countable and dense linear orderings without endpoints are
isomorphic, which in an abstract version, can be stated as Lemma 3.4(d). The technique
he used is now called back-and-forth method, and is widely used in model theory. We
start by defining partial isomorphisms:
Definition 3.1. Let A and B be S-structures and let p be a map such that dom(p) ⊆ A and
rg(p) ⊆ B. Then p is a partial isomorphism from A to B if and only if p has the following
properties:
1. p is injective.
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2. p is a morphism in the following sense:
a) For n-ary P ∈ S and a1, ..., an ∈ dom(p), PAa1 . . . an iff PBp(a1)...p(an).
b) For n-ary f ∈ S and a1, ..., an, a ∈ dom(p), fA(a1, ..., an) = a iff fB(p(a1)...p(an)) =
p(a).
c) For c ∈ S and a ∈ dom(p), cA = a iff cB = p(a).
We write Part(A,B) for the set of all partial isomorphisms from A to B.
Definition 3.2. A and B are finitely isomorphic (A ∼= f B) if and only if there is a sequence
(In)n∈ω such that:
(a) Every In is a nonempty set of partial isomorphisms from A to B.
(b) (Forth-property) For every p ∈ In+1 and a ∈ A, there is q ∈ In such that p ⊆ q and
a ∈ dom(q).
(c) (Back-property) For every p ∈ In+1 and b ∈ B, there is q ∈ In such that p ⊆ q and
b ∈ rg(q).
We can informally understand (b) and (c) as follows: partial isomorphisms in In can
be extendend n times and these extensions lie in In−1, ..., I0.
Definition 3.3. A and B are partially isomorphic (A ∼=p B) if and only if there is a set I such
that:
(a) I is a nonempty set of partial isomorphisms from A to B.
(b) (Forth-property) For every p ∈ I and a ∈ A, there is q ∈ I such that p ⊆ q and a ∈ dom(q).
(c) (Back-property) For every p ∈ I and b ∈ B, there is q ∈ I such that p ⊆ q and b ∈ rg(q).
The following lemma lists the basic relations between all the notions of isomorphism
we have described.
Lemma 3.4. (a) If A ∼= B, then A ∼=p B.
(b) If A ∼=p B, then A ∼= f B.
(c) If A ∼= f B and A is finite, then A ∼= B.
(d) If A ∼=p B and A and B are countable, then A ∼= B.
Proof. (a) If π : A ∼= B, then I : A ∼=p B for I = {π}.
(b) If I : A ∼=p B, then (I)n∈ω : A ∼= f B.
(c) If (In)n∈ω : A ∼= f B and A has exactly r elements, A = {a1, ..., ar}, we choose
p ∈ Ir+1. If we apply the forth property r times, we obtain q ∈ I1 such that a1, ..., ar ∈
dom(q) = A. If rg(q) 6= B, we take b ∈ B\rg(q) and by the back-property there
would be a proper extension q′ of q in I0 with b ∈ rg(q′). Since dom(q) = A, this is
not possible. Therefore q : A ∼= B.
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(d) Suppose I : A ∼=p B, A = {ai}i∈ω and B = {bj}j∈ω. Taking an arbitrary p0 ∈ I, we
can repeatedly apply the back-and-forth properties obtaining extensions p1, p2, ... ∈
I such that a1 ∈ dom(p1), b1 ∈ rg(p2), a2 ∈ dom(p3), b2 ∈ rg(p4), ... and so on. That
is, a sequence (pn)n∈ω of partial isomorphisms in I that for all n satisfy:
(i) pn ⊆ pn+1.
(ii) If n = 2r− 1, then ar ∈ dom(pn).
(iii) If n = 2r, then br ∈ rg(pn).
By (i), p :=
⋃
n∈ω pn is a partial isomorphism from A to B. By (ii) and (iii), dom(p) =
A and rg(p) = B, thus p : A ∼= B.
3.2. Fraïssé’s theorem
In this section, S will be a finite relational language. We can make any set relational
(i.e. having only relation symbols) by replacing functions and constants by their graphs.
We start with a easy but useful result that gives a first conection between partial iso-
morphisms and satisfaction relation (To simplify the notation, in this section LSr will be
the subset of LSωω composed by the formulas with r free variables v0, ..., vr−1).
Lemma 3.5. For a0, ..., ar−1 ∈ A and b0, ..., br−1 ∈ B, the following statements are equivalent:
p(ai) := bi for i < r determines a partial isomorphism from A to B.
For every atomic formula ψ ∈ LSr , A |= ψ[a0, ..., ar−1] iff B |= ψ[b0, ..., br−1].
Proof. A straightforward induction. It can be found in XII. 1.2(c) in [5].
Remark 3.6. It is easy to check that, in general, a partial isomorphism does not preserve
the validity of formulas with quantifiers. For example, take S = {<} and let p the partial
isomorphism from (R,<) to (Z,<) with dom(p) = {2, 3} and p(2) = 3, p(3) = 4. Then
(R,<) |= ∃v2(v0 < v2 ∧ v2 < v1)[2, 3],
but
not (Z,<) |= ∃v2(v0 < v2 ∧ v2 < v1)[p(2), p(3)].
However, there is still some subtle relation between partial isomorphisms and the validity
of formulas: following with the previous example, for any two a < b the validity of
(Z,<) |= ∃v2(v0 < v2 ∧ v2 < v1)[p(a), p(b)] is equivalent to the existence of a partial
isomorphism q which extends p and has (for example) a+b2 in its domain. Clearly, in the
particular case with dom(p) = {2, 3} and p(2) = 3, p(3) = 4, such extension does not
exist.
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This remark indicates the key idea for the algebraic characterization of elementary
equivalence: if the truth of formulas with quantifiers is preserved under partial isomor-
phisms, provided that these admit certain extensions, then elementary equivalence of
structures amounts to the existence of these extensions. Properly formalized, this is the
main result of the section:
Theorem 3.7 (Fraïssé). For any two S-structures A and B,
A ≡ B iff A ∼= f B.
We devote the rest of the section to prove this theorem. First we define the quantifier
rank of a formula as the maximum number of nested quantifiers occurring in it:
Definition 3.8. For each ϕ ∈ LSωω we recursively define his quantifier rank as follows:
(a) qr(ϕ) = 0 if ϕ is atomic.
(b) qr(¬ϕ) = qr(ϕ).
(c) qr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max{qr(ϕ), qr(ψ)}.
(d) qr(∃xϕ) = qr(ϕ) + 1.
Informally, the following lemma says that partial isomorphisms in In preserve truth
value of formulas with quantifier rank ≤ n.
Lemma 3.9. Let (In)n∈ω : A ∼= f B. Then for every ϕ ∈ LSr with qr(ϕ) ≤ n, any p ∈ In and any
a0, ..., ar−1 ∈ dom(p), A |= ϕ[a0, ..., ar−1] if and only if B |= ϕ[p(a0), ..., p(ar−1)].
Proof. We prove it by induction on formulas:
(a) For atomic formulas the result follows from Lemma 3.5.
(b) If ϕ = ¬ψ, then A |= ϕ[a0, ..., ar−1] iff not A |= ψ[a0, ..., ar−1], which is equivalent, by
induction hypothesis, to not B |= ψ[p(a0), ..., p(ar−1)] iff B |= ϕ[p(a0), ..., p(ar−1)].
(c) For ϕ = ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 the proof is analogous.
(d) If ϕ = ∃xψ, we may assume x = vr. Because qr(ϕ) = qr(∃xψ) ≤ n, we have qr(ψ) ≤
n − 1. Now, A |= ϕ[a0, ..., ar−1] iff there is a ∈ A such that A |= ψ[a0, ..., ar−1, a],
and by induction hypothesis and the forth property of p, there is q ∈ In−1 such
that p ⊆ q, a ∈ dom(q) and B |= ψ[p(a0), ..., p(ar−1), q(a)], and taking b = q(a)
we have that there is b ∈ B such that B |= ψ[p(a0), ..., p(ar−1), b], which means
B |= ϕ[p(a0), ..., p(ar−1)]. Now, using the back property and induction hypothesis,
the reciprocal is completely symmetric.
Corollary 3.10. If A ∼= f B then A ≡ B.
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Proof. Just use Lemma 3.9 with r = 0, n = qr(ϕ) and any p ∈ In.
To prove the reciprocal, for any br := b0, ..., br−1 ∈ B we introduce certain formulas
ϕ0B,br ∈ L
S
r that will describe the isomorphism type of the substructure [b0, ..., br−1]B. For
n > 0, ϕnB,br will indicate to which isomorphism types b
r can be extended in B by adding
n elements.
Our goal will be to build the formulas so that B |= ϕnB,br [b
r] for all n, and if A |=
ϕnB,br [a
r] for ar ∈ A then the map ai 7→ bi for i < r is a partial isomorphism that can be
extended back-and-forth n times.
Definition 3.11. We set φr := {ϕ ∈ LSr | ϕ is atomic or negated atomic}. By recursion in n and
for all r and br ∈ B, we define:
ϕ0B,br :=
∧




{ϕnB,brb | b ∈ B} ∧
∧
{∃vr ϕnB,brb | b ∈ B}.
Remark 3.12. Since S is finite and only contains relation symbols, φr is finite and φ0 =
∅. By induction on n, we easily obtain that the set {ϕnB,br | b
r ∈ B} is finite and the
conjunctions and disjunctions occurring in Definition 3.11 are finite, hence ϕnB,br are first-
order formulas.
It is also easy to check, using induction over n again, that qr(ϕnB,br ) = n and B |=
ϕnB,br [b
r] for all n ∈ ω.
Lemma 3.13. If A |= ϕnB,br [a
r], then ar 7→ br ∈ Part(A,B).
Proof. The case n = 0 is a consequence of Lemma 3.5. Let A |= ϕn+1B,br [a
r]. We choose
an arbitrary a ∈ A. Since A |= ∀vr
∨{ϕnB,brb | b ∈ B}[ar], there is some b ∈ B such that
A |= ϕnB,brb[a
ra]. By induction hypothesis, ara 7→ brb ∈ Part(A,B), hence ar 7→ br ∈
Part(A,B).
For n ∈ ω we set Jn := {ar 7→ br | r ∈ ω, ar ∈ A, br ∈ B andA |= ϕnB,br [a
r]}. Putting
everything together:
Lemma 3.14. (a) Jn ⊆ Part(A,B).
(b) If n > 0 and A |= ϕnB(= ϕnB,∅), then ∅ ∈ Jn, hence Jn 6= ∅.
(c) (Jn)n∈ω has the back-and-forth properties.
Proof. (a) Follows inmediately from Lemma 3.13.
(b) Is a direct consequence of the definition of Jn.
(c) Let p = ar 7→ br ∈ Jn+1 and a ∈ A. Then A |= ϕn+1B,br [a
r], in particular, A |=
∀vr
∨{ϕnB,brb | b ∈ B}[ar]. Therefore, there is b ∈ B such that A |= ϕnB,brb[ara]. Then,
by Lemma 3.13, ara 7→ brb ∈ Jn which extends p (forth-property). Since also A |=∧{∃vr ϕnB,brb | b ∈ B}[ar], for each b ∈ B there is a ∈ A such that A |= ϕnB,brb[ara] and,
again by Lemma 3.13, ara 7→ brb ∈ Jn (back-property).
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We can finally prove the left-to-right direction of Fraïssé’s theorem: If A ≡ B, since for
n > 1, B |= ϕnB, we have A |= ϕnB, and by the previous lemma we get (Jn)n∈ω : A ∼= f B.
In the proof of Lindström’s theorem we will not need Fraïssé’s theorem in its full
extension, so we now state a weaker version of it which is going to be used in the next
chapter.
Definition 3.15. Two structures are said to be m-isomorphic (A ∼=m B) if there is a sequence
I0, ..., Im of nonempty sets of partial isomporphisms from A to B with the back-and-forth properties.
By Lemma 3.9 we know that the partial isomorphisms in Im preserve the validity of
formulas with quantifier rank ≤ m, so if we write A ≡m B in case A and B satisfy the
same sentences of quantifier rank ≤ m, by the Fraïssé’s theorem we know that A ∼=m B if
and only if A ≡m B.
It is very common to present these theorems in a game theoretical form so that the ins
and outs of the relation between elementary equivalence and partial isomorphisms are
easier to handle. These games are known as Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games or back-and-forth
games, and play an important role in theoretical computer science, since they are also





In this chapter we prove one of the main results of this work: Lindström’s first theorem.
Informally, this states that first-order logic is the most expresive among those that still
satisfy the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems. We first formalize the notion
of a logic "being more expresive than" other and in section 4.2 we prove Lindström’s
theorem using the results from Chapter 3. The whole chapter follows [5] and [2].
4.1. Logical systems
In the following we give an abstract definition of logical system that collects properties
shared by all the logics we have considered. As we mentioned before, the idea goes back
to Lindström’s definition of abstract logic or generalized first-order logic in [10].
Definition 4.1. A logical system L consists of a function L and a binary relation |=L. L maps
every language S to the set L(S) of S-sentences of L and |=L is a relation between structures and
sentences of L. The following properties hold:
(a) If S0 ⊆ S1, then L(S0) ⊆ L(S1).
(b) If A |=L ϕ, then A is an S-structure for some language S and ϕ ∈ L(S).
(c) (Isomorphism property) If A |=L ϕ and A ∼= B, then B |=L ϕ.
(d) (Reduct property) If S0 ⊆ S1, ϕ ∈ L(S0) and A is an S1-structure, then A |=L ϕ iff
A|S0 |=L ϕ.
If L is a logical system and ϕ ∈ L(S), we can define
ModSL(ϕ) := {A |A is an S-structure and A |=L ϕ}.
This suggests the following definition for the relative expresive power of logical systems:
Definition 4.2. Let L and L∗ be logical systems.
(a) Let S be a language, ϕ ∈ L(S) and ψ ∈ L∗(S). The sentences ϕ and ψ are said to be logically




(b) L∗ is at least as strong as L (L ≤ L∗) iff for every S and every ϕ ∈ L(S) there is a ψ ∈ L∗(S)
such that ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent.
(c) L and L∗ are equally strong (L ∼ L∗) iff L ≤ L∗ and L∗ ≤ L.
We can now define some general semantic notions in an analogous way to Lωω. For
example, ϕ ∈ L(S) is said to be satisfiable if ModSL 6= ∅. Also, if Φ ⊆ L(S) then Φ |=L ϕ
iff every model of Φ is a model of ϕ.
Definition 4.3. A logical system if said to be regular if it satisfies the following three properties:
Boole(L) (L contains Boolean connectives):
(a) Given S and ϕ ∈ L(S), there is ψ ∈ L(S) such that for every S-structure A, A |=L ψ
iff not A |=L ϕ.
(b) Given S and ϕ, ψ ∈ L(S), there is χ ∈ L(S) such that for every S-structure A, A |=L χ
iff (A |=L ϕ or A |=L ψ).
Rel(L) (L permits relativization):
For S, ϕ ∈ L(S) and unary U, there is ψ ∈ L(S ∪ {U}) such that (A, UA) |=L ψ iff
[UA]A |=L ϕ for all S-structures A and all S-closed susbsets UA of A.
Repl(L) (L permits replacement of function symbols and constants by relation symbols). As
we have already done in previous chapter, the most common way to replace functions and
constants by relations is to define their graph as a new relation.
It is easy to prove that first-order logic is regular. The same arguments in the case of
Lωω are valid, with minimal changes, to prove that all the logical systems considered here
are regular too.
For a regular logical system such that Lωω ≤ L, let ϕ∗ be a L(S)-sentence equivalent
for the first-order S-sentence ϕ. We can define Φ∗ = {ϕ∗ | ϕ ∈ Φ}.
We introduce abbreviations for the properties we are going to consider in Lindström’s
theorem:
LöSko(L) (Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem holds for L): If ϕ ∈ L(S) is satisfiable, then
there is a model of ϕ whose domain is at most countable.
Comp(L) (The Compactness Theorem holds for L): if Φ ⊂ L(S) and every finite
subset of Φ is satisfiable, then Φ is satisfiable.
The following lemma is an easy but helpful consequence of Comp(L):
Lemma 4.4. Suppose Comp(L) and let Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(S) and Φ |=L ϕ. Then there is a finite
subset Φ0 ⊆ Φ such that Φ0 |=L ϕ.
Proof. Choose ¬ϕ by Boole(L). Then Φ ∪ {¬ϕ} is not satisfiable, and by Comp(L) there is
a finite subset Φ0 ⊆ Φ so that Φ0 ∪ {¬ϕ} is not satisfiable, i.e., Φ0 |=L ϕ.
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4.2. Lindström’s theorem
In the following, let L be a regular logical system with Lωω ≤ L.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose Comp(L) and ψ ∈ L(S). Then there is a finite subset S0 ⊂ S such that for
all S-structures A and B, if A|S0
∼= B|S0 then A |=L ψ iff B |=L ψ.
Proof. Let Φ be the set of the following S ∪ {U, V, f }-sentences:
∃xUx, ∃xVx, ∀x(Ux → V f x), ∀y(Vy→ ∃x(Ux ∧ f x = y)),
∀x∀y((Ux ∧Uy ∧ f x = f y)→ x = y) and, for every Rn ∈ S,
∀x1...∀xn((Ux1 ∧ ...∧Uxn)→ (Rx1 . . . xn ↔ R f x1 . . . f xn)).
Φ says that f is an isomorphism between the substructure induced by U and the one
induced by V. Then Φ∗ |=L ψU ↔ ψV :
In fact, if A is an S-structure and (A, UA, VA, f A) |=L Φ∗, UA and VA are nonempty
and f A
∣∣
UA is an isomorphism from [U
A]A to [VA]A. Then [UA]A |=L ψ iff [VA]A |=L ψ,
and by Rel(L), (A, UA) |=L ψU iff (A, VA) |=L ψV . Finally, by the reduct property and
Boole(L), (A, UA, VA, f A) |=L ψU ↔ ψV .
Now, by Comp(L) there is a finite Φ0 ⊆ Φ such that Φ∗0 |= ψU ↔ ψV and we may
choose a finite S0 ⊆ S such that Φ0 consists of S0-sentences.
Suppose π : A|S0
∼= B|S0 . We can assume, without loss of generality that A∩ B = ∅ (if
A∩ B 6= ∅ just take an isomorphic copy of B). We define over C := A∪ B an S∪ {U, V, f }-
structure (C, UC, VC, f C):
RC := RA ∪ RB, for R ∈ S.
UC = A, VC = B.
f C such that f C
∣∣
UC = π.
Then (C, UC, VC, f C) |=L Φ∗0 , thus (C, UC, VC, f C) |=L ψU ↔ ψV , and by Rel(L),
A |=L ψ iff B |=L ψ.
From now on, S will be a relational language and ψ an L(S)-sentence not logically
equivalent to any first-order sentence. The following lemma says that there are structures
A and B with A |=L ψ and B |=L ¬ψ, which are identical with respect to Lωω.
Lemma 4.6. Let S be a relational language and ψ ∈ L(S) a sentence which is not equivalent to
any first-order sentence. Then for every finite S0 ⊆ S and every m ∈ ω, there are S-structures A
and B such that:
A|S0
∼=m B|S0 , A |=L ψ and B |=L ¬ψ.




|A is an S-structure and A |=L ψ}.
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As we saw in the previous chapter, ϕ is a first-order sentence. Obviously ψ→ ϕ∗ is valid,
and since ψ is not logically equivalent to ϕ (hence not to ϕ∗), there is an S-structure B
such that B |=L ϕ∗ and B |=L ¬ψ. Now, B |= ϕ means that there is an S-structure A such
that A |=L ψ and B |= ϕmA|S0
. Therefore, we finally have A|S0
∼=m B|S0 .
In the proof os Lindström’s Theorem we are going to use the fact that this result can
be formulated in L. With that goal in mind, we turn to such a formulation.
For m ∈ ω we choose ψ,A,B, S0 and (In)n≤m such that (In)n≤m : A|S0
∼=m B|S0 ,
A |=L ψ and B |=L ¬ψ. Let S+ = S∪ {c, f , P, U, V, W,<, I, G} where c is a constant, f is a
unary function, P, U, V, W are unary relations, <, I are binary relations and G is a ternary
relation. We are going to define an S+-structure C that contains A and B and will allow
to describe the m-isomorphism property by including the partial isomorphisms from In
as elements of its domain:
C = A ∪ B ∪ {0, ..., m} ∪⋃n≤m In.
UC = A and [UC]C|S = A, VC = B and [VC]C|S = B.
WC = {0, ..., m} and <C is the natural order in WC. Furthermore, cC = m and f |WC




ICnp iff n ≤ m and p ∈ In.
GC pab iff PC p, a ∈ dom(p) and p(a) = b.
C is then a model of the conjunction, χ, of the following finite set of sentences of L(S+),
which yields the desired formulation of the m-isomorphism property:
(i) ∀p(Pp→ ∀x∀y(Gpxy→ (Ux ∧Vy))).
(ii) ∀p(Pp→ ∀x∀x′∀y∀y′((Gpxy ∧ Gpx′y′)→ (x = x′ ↔ y = y′))).
(iii) For every n-ary R ∈ S0, ∀p(Pp → ∀x1...∀xn∀y1...∀yn((Gpx1y1 ∧ ... ∧ Gpxnyn) →
(Rx1...xn ↔ Ry1...yn))).
(iv) The axioms of partial orderings.
(v) ∀x(Wx ↔ (x = c ∨ ∃y(y < x ∨ x < y))) ∧ ∀x(Wx → (x < c ∨ x = c)).
(vi) ∀x(∃y(y < x)→ ( f x < x ∧ ¬∃z( f x < z ∧ z < x))).
(vii) ∀x(Wx → ∃p(Pp ∧ Ixp)).
(viii) ∀x∀p∀u(( f x < x ∧ Ixp ∧Uu)→ ∃q∃v(I f xq ∧ Gquv ∧ ∀x′∀y′(Gpx′y′ → Gqx′y′))).
(ix) ∀x∀p∀v(( f x < x ∧ Ixp ∧Vu)→ ∃q∃u(I f xq ∧ Gquv ∧ ∀x′∀y′(Gpx′y′ → Gqx′y′))).
(x) ∃xUx ∧ ∃yVy ∧ ψU ∧ (¬ψ)V .
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Remark 4.7. The reader can easily check the meaning of the above sentences in the
structure C. As an example, (i) and (ii) say that P is a set of partial isomorphisms
and (viii) and (ix) say that P has the back-and-forth properties.
χ does not depend on m.
We use first-order sentences as an intuitive notation for corresponding L(S)-sentences.
For every m ∈ ω there is a model C of χ in which the domain WC of <C consists
exactly of m + 1 elements.
The next important lemma paves the way towards Lindström’s theorem and shows the
role of LöSko(L) in it.
Lemma 4.8. Assume LöSko(L). Then (a) or (b) holds:
(a) There are S-structures A and B such that A |=L ψ, B |=L ¬ψ and A|S0
∼= B|S0 .
(b) In all models D of χ, WD is finite.
Proof. We divide the proof in two parts:
First we show that if the S+-structure D is a model of χ in which the domain WD of <D
is infinite, then UD and VD are universes of S-structures A := [UD]D|S and B := [VD]D|S
such that A |=L ψ,B |=L ¬ψ and A|S0
∼=p B|S0 .
Indeed: Since D satisfies the sentence (x), UD, VD 6= ∅ and since S is relational, UD
and VD are domains of S-structures. Again by (x), D |=L ψU , D |=L (¬ψ)V and therefore
A |=L ψ, B |=L ¬ψ. From (i), (ii) and (iii) we know that every p ∈ PD corresponds via
GD to a partial isomorphism from A|S0 to B|S0 . We build the set I in the following way:
Since WD is infinite and cD is the last element of <D, <D has an infinite descending chain:
... <D ( f 2c)D <D ( f c)D <D cD. We set I := {p | there is an n with ID( f nc)D p}. By (vii)
we know that I 6= ∅, and by (viii) and (ix) that I has the back-and-forth properties, hence
the first claim is proved.
Now, suppose that (b) does not hold. So there is a model of χ in which W is infinite.
We may assume that the domain of the model is countable:
Let D a model of χ with WD infinite. Let Q be a new unary symbol and let θ be the
L(S+ ∪ {Q})-sentence: θ = Qc ∧ ∀x(Qx → ( f x < x ∧ Q f x)), with QD := {( f nc)D | n ∈
ω}. Then (D, QD) |=L χ ∧ θ, and by LöSko(L) there exists a countable model (E, QE) of
χ ∧ θ (hence a model of χ) with infinite WE.
So, using LöSko(L) we may assume the domain of D to be countable. Then, by the
first part, A|S0
∼=p B|S0 . Since both models are countable, they are isomorphic by Lemma
3.4(d) and (a) is satisfied.
We can now summarize all the information we have in the following result:
Lemma 4.9 (Main Lemma). Let L be a regular logical system with Lωω ≤ L and LöSko(L). Let
S be a relational language and ψ ∈ L(S) not logically equivalent to any first-order sentence. Then
(a) or (b) holds:
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(a) For all finite subsets S0 ⊆ S there are S-structures A, B such that A |=L ψ, B |=L ¬ψ and
A|S0
∼= B|S0 .
(b) For a unary relation symbol W and a suitable S ∪ {W} ⊆ S+ with finite S+ \ S, there is an
L(S+)-sentence χ such that:
(i) In every model C of χ, WC is finite and nonempty.
(ii) For every m ≥ 1 there is a model C of χ in which WC has exactly m elements.
Finally, we show:
Theorem 4.10 (Lindström’s First Theorem). For a regular logical system L with Lωω ≤ L, the
following is true:
If LöSko(L) and Comp(L), then Lωω ∼ L.
Proof. Assume that there is ψ ∈ L(S) not logically equivalent to any first-order sentence.
We can assume S is relational. Since Comp(L) holds, the meaning of ψ depends only on
finitely many symbols, so we can choose a finite S0 ⊆ S such that for all S-structures A
and B, A|S0
∼= B|S0 .
Then Lemma 4.9(a) is not satisfied and 4.9(b) must hold: there is a L(S+)-sentence χ
which satisfies 4.9(b)(i) and 4.9(b)(ii). But this contradicts Comp(L): By 4.9(b)(i), {χ} ∪
{"W contains at least n elements" | n ∈ ω} is not satisfiable but by 4.9(b)(ii), every finite
subset has a model. The contradiction arises by the assumption that such ψ exists, so the
theorem is proved.
The technicalities of the proof we have just developed can easily distract us from un-
derstanding the role of the Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems in it. To clarify
it, we describe the main idea of the proof:
Starting with the assumption that ψ is a L(S)-sentence which is not logically equivalent
to any first-order sentence, for any m ≥ 1 we obtain structures A and B with A |=L ψ,
B |=L ¬ψ and A ∼=m B. By Comp(L) we get structures A and B with A |=L ψ, B |=L ¬ψ
and A ∼=p B. Now LöSko(L) allows to find countable structures which satisfy the previous
relations, therefore, by Lemma 3.4(d), A |=L ψ, B |=L ¬ψ and A ∼= B, a contradiction.
One could point out that the name of Lindström’s first theorem suggests that there is at
least a second one. In fact there are a handful of characterizations of first-order logic which
are equivalent to Lindström’s first theorem grouped under the generic name of Lindström’s




Elementary extensions and the
omitting types theorem
In this chapter we introduce two basic techniques of model theory with a wide range
of applications. Our goal is to use them in the next chapter, and with that instrumental
purpose in mind, we just develop the necessary tools to prove the two main theorems. For
a extense exposition of the topics treated here see [4].
5.1. Elementary extensions
Definition 5.1 (Elementary extension). Let A and B be structures of the language S. We say
that A is an elementary substructure of B (or that B is a elementary extension of A) if A ⊆ B
and for every formula φ(x1, ..., xn) in LSωω and every n-tuple a1, ..., an ∈ A, A |= φ[a1, ..., an] if
and only if B |= φ[a1, ..., an]. In this case we write A  B.
Remark 5.2. The following points give some basic properties of elementary extensions:
(1) A  A.
(2) If A  B and B  C then A  C.
(3) If A  C, B  C and A ⊆ B then A  B.
Remark 5.3. Obviously, if A  B, we have A ≡ B, but not viceversa:
Let B = 〈ω,<〉 and A = 〈ω \ {0},<〉. Since they are isomorphic, A ≡ B, but when
φ(y) = ∀x(y < x ∨ y = x), we have A |= φ[1] and B 2 φ[1], which means A  B.
The following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a substructure to
be elementary.
Theorem 5.4 (Vaught-Tarski test). Let B be a structure in the language S and A ⊆ B. The
following are equivalent:
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(1) A  B.
(2) For every a2, ..., an ∈ A and every formula φ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω, if B |= ∃x1φ[a2, ..., an],
then there is a1 ∈ A such that B |= φ[a1, ..., an].
Proof. The first implication is trivial and we can turn to prove the reciprocal by induction
on φ.
The induction is easy to carry out for atomic formulas and for sentential connectives.
Now assume φ(x2, ..., xn) = ∃x1 ϕ(x1, ..., xn). Given a2, ..., an ∈ A, if A |= ∃x1 ϕ[a2, ..., an],
then there is a1 ∈ A such that A |= ϕ[a1, ..., an]. By hypothesis, B |= ϕ[a1, ..., an], whence
B |= ∃x1 ϕ[a2, ..., an]. On the other hand, if B |= ∃x1 ϕ[a2, ..., an], by assumption, there
is a1 ∈ A such that B |= ϕ[a1, .., an]. Finally, by induction, A |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] and A |=
∃x1 ϕ[a2, ..., an].
We now introduce the definition of elementary chain of models. The idea behind is
that we can build a new model considering the union of the models in the chain.
Definition 5.5. Let α be an ordinal. A chain of models of lenght α is a sequence (Ai, i < α) of
models where Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for every i < α. The chain is elementary if Ai  Aj for every i ≤ j < α.
Remark 5.6. We can build the union of the chain, A =
⋃




(b) If c ∈ S, then cA = cAi , where i < α is arbitrary.
(c) If R ∈ S is a relation symbol, RA = ⋃i<α RAi .
(d) If f ∈ S is an n-ary function symbol and a1, ..., an ∈ A, fA(a1, ..., an) = fAi (a1, ..., an),
where i < α and a1, ..., an ∈ Ai.
The following lemma gives the inspiration for the next theorem. The proof is trivial by
the construction of A.
Lemma 5.7. Let (Ai, i < α) be a chain. A =
⋃
i<α Ai is a model such that Aj ⊆ A, for every
j < α.
We are now ready to prove the main result in this section, a classical result in model
theory attributed to Tarski. It will prove to be very useful in the next chapter.
Theorem 5.8. If (Ai, i < α) is an elementary chain, Aβ 
⋃
i<α Ai, for every β < α.
Proof. Let A =
⋃
i<α Ai. We prove the following for all formulas ϕ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ L, and for
every β < α, a1, ..., an ∈ Aβ:
Aβ |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] if and only if A |= ϕ[a1, ..., an].
The case of atomic formulas and sentential connectives is an easy routine. Assume ϕ =
∃x1ψ and a2, ..., an ∈ Aβ. If Aβ |= ψ[a2, ..., an], then there is a1 ∈ Aβ such that Aβ |=
ψ[a1, ..., an]. By induction hypothesis, A |= ψ[a1, ..., an], hence A |= ∃x1ψ[a2, ..., an].
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On the other hand, A |= ∃x1ψ[a2, ..., an] means that there is a1 ∈ A such that A |=
ψ[a1, ..., an]. Then for some γ < α, a1 ∈ Aγ and a1, ..., an ∈ Aγ. By induction, Aγ |=
ψ[a1, ..., an], hence Aγ |= ∃x1ψ[a2, ..., an]. If γ ≤ β we are done, so we may assume β ≤ γ.
Since Aβ  Aγ, we have, by definition, Aβ |= ∃x1ψ[a2, ..., an].
5.2. Omitting types
Recall that a theory T ⊆ LSωω is a satisfiable set of sentences that is closed under
consequence. A theory is complete if for every S-sentence ϕ we have ϕ ∈ T or ¬ϕ ∈ T.
Definition 5.9. Let A be a model, a1, ..., an ∈ A and Σ = {σi(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω | i ∈ I}. We say
that a1, ..., an realizes Σ in A if and only if for every σi ∈ Σ, A |= σi[a1, ..., an].
Definition 5.10. We say that A omits Σ if and only if A does not realize Σ, that is, if and only if
there are not a1, ..., an ∈ A such that A |= σi[a1, ..., an] for every σi ∈ Σ.
Remark 5.11. If Σ is finite, it is easy to determine whether A omits Σ: A realizes Σ =
{σ1, ..., σm} if and only if A |= φ := ∃x1 . . . xn(σ1 ∧ . . . ∧ σm).
Definition 5.12. We say that a formula σ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω is consistent with a theory T if and
only if there is a model of T which realizes σ. More generaly, Σ = {σi(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω | i ∈ I}
is consistent with T if and only if T has a model which realizes Σ.
Definition 5.13. Let Σ(x1, ..., xn) be a set of formulas from the language S. We say that Σ is
isolated in T if and only if there is φ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω such that:
1. φ is consistent with T.
2. T |= φ→ σ for every σ ∈ Σ.
If such φ does not exist, we say that Σ is not isolated in T.
Remark 5.14. It is easy to check that if Σ is not isolated, for every φ ∈ LSωω consistent with
T there is σ ∈ Σ such that φ ∧ ¬σ is consistent with T.
The following result is the converse of the omitting types theorem, with the extra
condition that T has to be a complete theory.
Proposition 5.15. Let T a complete theory of L and Σ(x1, ..., xn) a set of formulas. iF T has a
model which omits Σ, then Σ is not isolated in T.
Proof. We will set that if Σ is isolated in T, then every model of T realizes Σ. Let
φ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ LSωω a formula consistent with T such that T |= φ→ σ, for every σ ∈ Σ. Let
A a model of T. Since T is complete, T |= ∃x1 . . . xnφ, i. e., there are a1, ..., an ∈ A such that
A |= φ[a1, ..., an], and by propositional logic, A |= σ[a1, ..., an] for every σ ∈ Σ. This clearly
means that a1, ..., an realize Σ in A.
We now formulate the omitting types theorem in the case of one free variable. Both
the result and the proof are the same for the n variable case, but the notation becomes
needlessly complicated.
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Theorem 5.16 (Omitting types theorem). Let T be a consistent and countable theory of LSωω
and Σ = Σ(x) a set of formulas. If Σ is not isolated in T, then T has a countable model which
omits Σ.
Proof. Assume that Σ is not isolated in T. Let C = {ci | i < ω} be a countable set of
new constants and consider S′ = S ∪ C. S′ is still countable and we can arrange the
sentences of LS
′
ωω: φ0, φ1,... Now are going to build an increasing sequence of theories
T = T0 ⊆ T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ ... such that:
(1) Every Tm is consistent and a finite extension of T made up by sentences of L
S∪{ci | i<m}
ωω .
(2) φm ∈ Tm+1 or ¬φm ∈ Tm+1 for every m ∈ ω.
(3) If φm = ∃xψ(x) and φm ∈ Tm+1, then ψ(cm) ∧ ¬σ(cm) ∈ Tm+1, for some σ ∈ Σ.
First we construct the sequence satisfying (1)-(3). Assume that we already have Tn. If
φn is not consistent with Tn, ¬φn will. If Tn is consistent with φn (or ¬φn) and φn does not
start with an existential quantifier, Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {φn} (or Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {¬φn}). In the case
φn = ∃xψ(x) is consistent with Tn, let ϕ be the conjunction of the sentences from Tn \ T.
Let χ(c0, ...cn−1, x) = ϕ ∧ ψ(x). Then ∃x0 . . . xn−1χ(x0, . . . , xn−1, x) is consistent with T.
Since Σ is not isolated in T, there is σ ∈ Σ such that ∃x0 . . . xn−1χ(x0, ...xn−1, x)∧¬σ(x)
is consistent with T. And in conclusion, we can ensure that χ(c0, ...cn−1, cn) ∧ ¬σ(cn) is
also consistent with T, guaranteeing that Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {ψ(cn) ∧ ¬σ(cn)} is consistent.
Once the sequence is constructed, we can consider Tω =
⋃
n<ω Tn. By (1) and (2) we
know that Tω is a maximal consistent theory in LS
′
ωω. Let B′ = (B, CB) be a countable




1 , .... By
(3) we know that Tω has witnesses in C, so by Lemma 1.18 A = {cB
′
i }i<ω. Clearly A′ is a
model of Tω, hence A is a countable model of T.
Now we are ready to prove that A omits Σ. Assume that a ∈ A is a realization of Σ.
In that case, a = cB
′
n for some n < ω. Consider the sentence φm = ∃xx = cn. Since the
sentence is consistent with Tm, there is σ ∈ Σ such that (cm = cn) ∧ ¬σ(cm) ∈ Tm+1 by (3),
whence Tω |= ¬σ(cn). This means that A |= ¬σ[a] in contradiction with the assumption
that a realizes Σ.
For a topological proof of Theorem 5.16, see [3].
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Chapter 6
Logic with the quantifier "there
exist uncountably many"
As we have mentioned, the idea of adding quantifiers to first-order logic goes back to
Mostowski [11]. For obvious mathematical reasons, cardinality quantifiers were a natural
way of doing it, and Fuhrken [6] and Vaught [16] were the first to study compactness and
completeness for the logic L(Q1), obtained by adjoining the quantifier Q1 (there exists
uncountably many) to first-order logic. The first systematical study of L(Q1) was due to
Keisler [8], whose paper is the basis for our exposition. The main result in this chapter
is the Completeness theorem for L(Q1), that has countable Compactness as a corollary.
As a proper extension of first-order logic, L(Q1) will not satisfy both the countable Com-
pactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, but we will show that it is very close to
satisfying them, and in that sense L(Q1) will be the best behaving extension studied here.
6.1. The language L(Q)
From now on we will consider the first-order logic Lωω with identity. We form the
logical system L(Q1) by adding to Lωω a new quantifier Q1x which will be interpreted
as "there are uncountably many x". Then, the set of formulas of LS(Q1) is the least set
Φ which contains all the atomic formulas of Lωω and satisfies the following: If ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ
and y is a variable, then ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ, ∃yϕ and Qyϕ ∈ Φ. From now on we follow Keisler’s
notation, writing Q instead of Q1, L for the language and L(Q) for the formulas in the
language L.
Our way of dealing with L(Q) will be to reduce it to first-order logic in some manner
we may apply first-order model theory to obtain the desired results. This approach will
rely on weak models as they were introduced by Keisler:
Definition 6.1. A weak model for L(Q) is a pair (A, q) such that A is a first-order structure
and q is a set of subsets of A. Given a n-tuple a1, ..., an ∈ A and the formula ϕ(v1, ..., vn) ∈ L(Q),
the satisfaction relation is defined in the usual way by induction on the complexity of ϕ, and the
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Qx clause in the definition is:
(A, q) |= Qvm ϕ[a1, ..., an] iff {b ∈ A | (A, q) |= ϕ[a1, ..., am−1, b, am+1, ..., an]} ∈ q
for m ≤ n.
In a weak model the validity of Qx depends on some subsets of the universe, and
when those subsets are exactly those we expect, we have an standard model:
Definition 6.2. A is an standard model of L(Q) if it is a weak model (A, q) where q is the set of
all uncountable subsets of A.
Thus an standard model interprets Qx appropiately as "there are uncountably many
x".
While the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem fails in L(Q) (consider the sentence
Qx(x = x)), a modified version of it holds:
Theorem 6.3 (Downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for ≤ ω1). If A is an standard model
of L(Q), then there exists B ≺Q A (where ≺Q means that B is an elementary substructure of A
in L(Q)) such that |B| ≤ ω1.
Proof. Assuming |A| > ω1 (otherwise the argument is done), the usual proof of the down-
ward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem can be easily modified to provide ω1 witnesses to each
Qxϕ(x) instead of only one, see for example Lemma 2.6.
Compactness theorem for L(Q) is proved here following the classical method: first
prove completeness and then derive compactness from it. This means that we have to give
a deductive calculus for L(Q), that is, a set of axioms and rules of inference, and prove the
Completeness theorem with it. We now introduce axioms for L(Q). This will be schemes
of formulas which are obviously true in all standard models:
Axiom 0 All the axiom schemes for Lωω.
Axiom 1 ¬Qx(x = y ∨ x = z);
Axiom 2 ∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Qxϕ→ Qxψ);
Axiom 3 Qxϕ(x)↔ Qyϕ(y);
Axiom 4 Qy∃xϕ→ (∃xQyϕ ∨Qx∃yϕ);
The intuitive content of Axiom 1 is: "every set of power ≤ 2 is countable". The intuitive
content of Axiom 2 is: "every set with an uncountable subset is uncountable". Axiom 4
says "If
⋃
x∈X ax is uncountable then either some ax is uncountable or X is uncountable".
Vaught and Fuhrken proposed this set of axioms and conjectured that L(Q) was complete
with them, but did not give a proof.
We hope the reader is now convinced that the following lemma is straightforward:
Lemma 6.4. Every model A of Lωω is a standard model of the axioms of L(Q).
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It is easy to find weak models which do not satisfy the axioms of L(Q). However,
there are weak models (other than the standard models) which do satisfy the axioms. For
example, if q is the set of all infinite subsets of A, (A, q) is a weak model of all the axioms
of L(Q).
The rules of inference if L(Q) are the same as for Lωω:
Modus ponens: From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ we infer ψ.
Generalization: From ϕ we infer ∀xϕ.
The following four lemmas give L(Q) versions of basic proof-theoretical properties
of first-order logic. Their first-order proofs can easily be modified for this case, so we
enunciate them without proof.
Lemma 6.5. Let (A, q) be a weak model of all the axioms of L(Q). If ` ϕ, then (A, q) |= ϕ. If
Σ ` ϕ and (A, q) is a weak model of Σ, then (A, q) |= ϕ.
Lemma 6.6. If Σ is a set of sentences of L(Q) and Σ has a standard model, then Σ is consistent
in L(Q). If A is a standard model of Σ and Σ ` ϕ, then ϕ holds in A.
Lemma 6.7 (Deduction theorem). Let Σ be a set of sentences of L(Q) and ϕ a sentence of L(Q).
If Σ ∪ {ϕ} ` ψ then Σ ` ϕ→ ψ.
Lemma 6.8. Let Σ be a maximal consistent set of sentences of L(Q). Then for all sentences ϕ, ψ
of L(Q) we have
¬ϕ ∈ Σ iff ϕ 6∈ Σ
and
ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ iff ϕ ∈ Σ and ψ ∈ Σ.
The following lemma shows that certain formulas are provable in L(Q). They will be
used during the proof of the Completeness theorem.
Lemma 6.9. Let ϕ, ψ be formulas, and x, y distinct variables, of L(Q).
(i) ` Qxϕ→ ∃xϕ.
(ii) ` ∃xQyϕ→ Qy∃ϕ.
(iii) If x does not occur free in ϕ, then ` Qx(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ ∧Qxψ.
(iv) ` Qx(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Qxϕ ∨Qxψ.
(v) ` Qxϕ ∧ ¬Qxψ→ Qx(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
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Proof. (i) Let y, z no occuring in ϕ. By propositional logic,
` ¬∃xϕ→ ∀x(ϕ→ (x = y ∨ x = z)).
By Axiom 2 and propositional logic,
` ¬∃xϕ→ (Qxϕ→ Qx(x = y ∨ x = z)).
Now using Axiom 1, ` ¬∃xϕ→ ¬Qxϕ and (i) follows form propositional logic.
The rest of the formulas are derived in a similar way, but the proofs would be too long
for this section. They can be found in pages 9-12 of [8].
6.2. Completeness theorem for L(Q)
From now in L will be a countable language. In this section we shall prove the follow-
ing:
Theorem 6.10 (Completenes theorem for L(Q)). Let Σ be a set of sentences of L(Q), then Σ
has a standard model if and only if Σ is consistent in L(Q).
One direction is elementary and is stated in Lemma 6.6 above. We are going to prove
the hard direction: If Σ is consistent in L(Q) then Σ has a standard model. In a first stage,
we will use Henkin’s method of constructing models to show that Σ has a weak model
in which certain types can be omitted. Then we will construct a standard model from an
elementary chain of weak models.
Definition 6.11. Let Γ be a set of sentences of L(Q) and C a set of constant symbols of S. C is
said to be a set of witnesses for Γ iff for every sentence of the form ∃xϕ(x) there is c ∈ C such that
Γ ` ∃xϕ(x)→ ϕ(c).
Lemma 6.12. Let Γ be a maximal consistent set of sentences of L(Q) and let C be a set of witnesses
for Γ. Then Γ has a weak model (A, q) such that every element of A is the interpretation of some
c ∈ C.
Proof. Let Γ0 be the set of all first-order sentences in Γ. Then by Lemma 6.8, Γ0 is a maximal
consistent set in Lωω. Moreover, C is a set of witnesses for Γ0, so it follows from Henkin’s
proof of the completeness theorem that Γ0 has a model A such that every element of A is
the interpretation of some c ∈ C. If c̄ is the interpretation of c ∈ C, A = {c̄ | c ∈ C}. Our
goal now is to make A into a weak model (A, q) of Γ. For each formula ϕ(x) of L(Q) with
only one free variable x, let
Sϕ = {c̄ | c ∈ C and Γ ` ϕ(c)}.
We then define
q = {Sϕ | ϕ has only one free variable, say x, and Γ ` Qxϕ}.
Obviously q is a set of subsets of A, and we shall show by induction on ϕ that for all
sentences ϕ of L(Q),
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(1) (A, q) |= ϕ iff Γ ` ϕ.
Henkin’s proof of the Completeness theorem gives the result for first-order sentences, so
we just have to consider the case ϕ = Qxψ(x). By induction hypothesis we can assume
that (1) holds for all sentences ψ(c), c ∈ C. Then
(2) Sψ = {c̄ | Γ ` ψ(c)} = {c̄ | (A, q) |= ψ(c)} = {c̄ | (A, q) |= ψ[c]}.
If Γ ` Qxψ(x), then Sψ ∈ q by definition, so (A, q) |= Qxψ(x) by (2). Lets turn to the
reciprocal: Assume (A, q) |= Qxψ(x). Then Sψ ∈ q by (2). From the definition of q, there
is a formula θ(y) such that Sψ = Sθ and Γ ` Qyθ(y). By (2), c̄ ∈ Sψ implies Γ ` ψ(c), for
all c ∈ C, and the same occurs for θ. It follows from this that
Γ ` ψ(c) iff Γ ` θ(c), for all c ∈ C.
Thus Γ ` ψ(c)↔ θ(c), for all c ∈ C. Let u be a variable occurring in neither ψ nor θ. Since
C is a set of witnesses for Γ, Γ ` ∀u(ψ(u)↔ θ(u)). Using Axiom 2 we have Γ ` Quψ(u)↔
Quθ(u), and finally, by Axiom 3 and propositional logic, Γ ` Qxψ(x) ↔ Qyθ(y). Since
Γ ` Qyθ(y), we have Γ ` Qxψ(x). This completes the proof of (1), and it follows that
(A, q) is a model of Γ.
We can now use techniques inherited from first-order logic to prove that every consis-
tent set of sentences of L(Q) has a weak model:
Theorem 6.13 (Weak completeness theorem). Let Σ be a set of sentences of L(Q). Then Σ is
consistent if and only if Σ has a countable weak model in which all the axioms of L(Q) hold.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as Henkin’s proof of the completeness theorem
for Lωω. First assume Σ is consistent. We can enlarge the languange L to L∗ by adding
a countable set C of new individual constants. Σ is still consistent in L∗(Q), and by the
method of Henkin, Σ can be extended to a maximal consistent set of sentences Γ of L∗(Q)
such that C is a set of witnesses for Γ. By the previous lemma Γ has a weak model (A∗, q)
in which every element is an interpretation of some c ∈ C. Since C is countable, A∗ is
countable too. Since Γ is maximal consistent in L∗(Q), all axioms of L∗(Q) belong to Γ
and hold in (A∗, q). Let A be the reduct of A∗ to L. Then (A, q) is the requiered countable
weak model of Σ satisfying all axioms of L(Q). The converse follows from Lemma 6.5.
Lemma 6.14. Let Γ be a consistent set of sentences of L(Q), and for each n < ω let Σn(xn) be
a set of formulas of L(Q). Assume that for every n < ω and every formula ϕ(xn) of L(Q), if
∃xn ϕ(xn) is consistent with Γ then there exists σ ∈ Σn such that ∃xn(ϕ ∧ ¬σ) is consistent with
Γ. Then Γ has a countable weak model which omits each Σn.
This lemma is the generalization to L(Q) of the first-order omitting types theorem, and
the proof is essentially the same. We next introduce elementary chains of weak models.
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Definition 6.15. (B, r) is said to be an elementary extension of (A, q), (A, q)  (B, r), iff A ⊆ B
and for all formulas ϕ(x1, ..., xn) of L(Q) and all a1, ..., an ∈ A we have
(A, q) |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] iff (B, r) |= ϕ[a1, ..., an].
A sequence (Aα, qα), α < γ, of weak models is said to be an elementary chain iff we
have (Aα, qα) ≺ (Aβ, qβ) for all α < β < γ.
The union of such an elementary chain is the weak model (A, q) = ∪α<γ(Aα, qα) such
that A = ∪α<γAα and q = {S ⊆ A | For some β < γ, β ≤ α < γ implies S ∩ Aα ∈ qα}.
As the reader can see, the construction of the union of an elementary chain of weak
models is identical to the first-order case, with the exception of q, which is buit as the set
of all S ⊆ A such that Aα ∩ S is eventually in qα.
The following lemma extends Tarski’s theorem to L(Q):
Lemma 6.16. Let (Aα, qα), α < γ, be an elementary chain and let (A, q) be the union. Then for
all α < γ, (Aα, qα) ≺ (A, q).
Proof. We will show, by induction on the complexity of ϕ(x1, ..., xn), that
(1) For all α < γ and all a1, ..., an ∈ Aα,
(Aα, qα) |= ϕ[a1, ..., an] iff (A, q) |= ϕ[a1, ..., an].
The induction steps for first-order formulas are the same as in the proof of Theorem
5.8. We turn to the case ϕ = Qxψ. Assume α < γ and a1, ..., an ∈ Aα. We define
S = {a ∈ A | (A, q) |= ψ[a, a1, ..., an]}.
Let (A, q) |= Qxψ[a1, ..., an]. Then S ∈ q, and for some β, α ≤ β < γ and S ∩ Aβ ∈
qβ. Since, by induction hypothesis, (1) holds for ψ, S ∩ Aβ = {a ∈ Aβ | (Aβ, qβ) |=
ψ[a, a1, ..., an]}. Whence (Aβ, qβ) |= Qxψ[a1, ..., an], and since (Aα, qα) ≺ (Aβ, qβ), (Aα, qα) |=
Qxψ[a1, ..., an].
Now suppose (A, q) |= ¬Qxψ[a1, .., an]. Then S 6∈ q, so there exists β such that α ≤ β <
γ and S ∩ Aβ 6∈ qβ. Arguing as before, we have (Aα, qα) |= ¬Qxψ[a1, ..., an]. This shows
that ϕ = Qxψ satisfies (1).
Given a model A for L(Q), we denote by A∗ the model obtained by adding a new
constant ca to L for each a ∈ A and interpreting ca in A∗ by a. The following technical fact
is needed later:
Lemma 6.17. Let (A, q) be a weak model for L(Q) and let L∗ be the language of A∗. If (A, q)
satisfies all the axioms of L(Q), then (A∗, q) satisifies all the axioms of L∗(Q).
Proof. Let ϕ be any axiom of L ∗ (Q). Let ca1 , ..., can be all the constat symbols of L ∗ \L
which occur in ϕ. We form ψ by replacing each occurrence of cam in ϕ by vm (a new
variable), m ≤ n. Then ψ is an axiom of L(Q), therefore ψ holds in (A, q), hence ∀v1....∀vnψ
holds in (A, q). It follows that (A∗, q) |= ψ[a1, ..., an], hence ϕ holds in (A∗, q).
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We now prove our main lemma, which says that every countable weak model of all the
axioms of L(Q) has an elementary extension in which a set in q gets new elements and
every definable set which is not in q stays the same. This will solve the main problem of
constructing an standard model, because it will help us to keep the set of elements of A
satisfying ψ(x) countable when A |= ¬Qxψ(x).
Lemma 6.18 (Main lemma). Let (A, q) be a countable weak model in which all the axioms of
L(Q) hold. Let L∗ be the language of A∗ and let ϕ(x) be a formula of L∗(Q) such that (A∗, q) |=
Qxϕ(x). Then there is a countable elementary extension (B, r) of (A, q) such that:
(i) For some b ∈ B \ A, (B∗, r) |= ϕ[b].
(ii) For every formula ϕ(y) of L∗(Q) such that (A∗, q) |= ¬Qyψ(y), we have {a ∈ B | (B∗, r) |=
ψ[a]} ⊆ A.
Proof. We extend L∗ to L′ by adding a new constant c. Let Γ be the following set of
sentences:
(a) All sentences of L∗(Q) true in (A∗, q).
(b) ϕ(c).
(c) ¬ψ(c) for every ϕ(y) in L∗(Q) such that (A∗, q) |= ¬Qyψ(y).
We first prove the following claim:
(1) A sentence θ(c) is consistent with Γ iff (A∗, q) |= Qu(θ(u) ∧ ϕ(u)).
Here θ(c) comes from a formula θ(y) of L∗. To prove one direction of (1), assume that
¬Qu(θ(u)∧ ϕ(u)) holds in (A∗, q). Then ¬(θ(c)∧ ϕ(c)) belongs to Γ, and by propositional
logic, Γ ` ¬θ(c), whence θ(c) is not consistent with Γ.
Now assume that θ(c) is not consistent with Γ. By the deduction theorem, Γ ` ¬θ(c).
Then there is a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ0 ` ¬θ(c). Let Γ1 be the set of all sentences of type
(a) and let ¬ψ1(c), ...,¬ψn(c) be the sentences of type (c) which belong to Γ0. Then
Γ1 ∪ {ϕ(c),¬ψ1(c), ...,¬ψn(c)} ` ¬θ(c).
By the deduction theorem and propositional logic, Γ1 ` (ϕ(c)∧ θ(c)→ ψ1(c)∨ ...∨ψn(c)).
Since c does not occur in Γ1, Γ1 ` (ϕ(u)∧ θ(u)→ ψ1(u)∨ ...∨ψn(u)) where u is a variable
not occurring in the sentence on the right. By generalization we have
Γ1 ` ∀u(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(u)→ ψ1(u) ∨ ...∨ ψn(u)),
and by Axiom 2,
Γ1 ` Qu(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(u))→ Qu(ψ1(u) ∨ ...∨ ψn(u)).
Since the sentences ψi(c) are of type (c), we have Γ1 ` ¬Quψi(u), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Using Lemma
6.9(iv), Γ1 ` ¬Qu(ψ1(u) ∨ ... ∨ ψn(u)), thus Γ1 ` ¬Qu(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(u)). As (A∗, q) is a model
of Γ1, by Lemma 6.5, (A∗, q) |= ¬Qu(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(u)). This ends the proof of (1).
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Lets check that Γ is consistent. To see this, consider the valid sentence c = c. By
hypothesis, (A∗, q) |= Qxϕ(x), hence (A∗, q) |= Qu(ϕ(u) ∧ u = u), and it follows from (1)
that c = c is consistent with Γ, so Γ itself is consistent.
Since the set A is countable, the language of (A∗, q) has only countable many formulas
and we can arrange the formulas of ψ(x) ∈ L∗(Q) such that ψ(c) is in Γ of type (c) in a
countable list ψ0(y0), ψ1(y1), ....
For each n < ω, let Σn = {ψn(yn)} ∪ {¬yn = ca | a ∈ A}. Rawly, to omit Σn will mean
that there are no "new" elements that realize ψn(yn) aside from those in A.
We now are going to verify that the conditions of the omitting types theorem hold for
the set of sentences Γ and the sets of formulas Σn, n < ω. Suppose θ(yn, c) is a formula of
L′(Q) such that ∃ynθ(yn c) is consistent with Γ. We must show that
(2) There exists σ ∈ Σn such that ∃yn(θ ∧ ¬σ) is consistent with Γ.
By (1) we have (A∗, q) |= Qu(ϕ(u) ∧ ∃ynθ(yn, u)). By Lemma 6.9(iv), we have either
(3) (A∗, q) |= Qu[ϕ(u) ∧ ∃yn(θ(yn, u) ∧ ψn(yn))] or
(4) (A∗, q) |= Qu[ϕ(u) ∧ ∃yn(θ(yn, u) ∧ ¬ψn(yn))].
If (4) is the case, then by (1), ∃yn(θ(yn, c) ∧ ¬ψn(yn)) is consistent with Γ, and since
ψn(yn) ∈ Σn, (2) holds. Suppose (3) is the case. By predicate logic and Axiom 2,
(A∗, q) |= Qu∃yn(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(yn, u) ∧ ψn(yn)), and by Axiom 4 we have either
(5) (A∗, q) |= Qyn∃u(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(yn, u) ∧ ψn(yn)) or else
(6) (A∗, q) |= ∃ynQu(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(yn, u) ∧ ψn(yn)).
But (A∗, q) |= ¬Qynψn(yn), and hence by Axiom (2), (5) is impossible. Therefore (6) must
hold. Thus for some a ∈ A, (A∗, q) |= Qu(ϕ(u) ∧ θ(ca, u) ∧ ϕn(ca)). This means that
θ(ca, c) ∧ ψn(ca) is consistent with Γ, so θ(ca, c) is consistent with Γ too. It follows that
∃yn(θ(yn, c) ∧ ¬¬yn = ca) is consistent with Γ, and since ¬yn = ca ∈ Σn, condition (2)
holds.
Having verified (2) in both cases, we may apply the omitting types theorem (Lemma
5.16) and we get a countable weak model (B′, r) of Γ which omits each type Σn, n < ω.
We may assume without loss of generality that for each a ∈ A, ca is interpreted in B′ by
a. Let B be the reduct of B′ to the language L. Since (B′, r) satisfies all sentences true in
(A∗, q), we have (A, q) ≺ (B, r).
If b is the interpretation of the constant c in B′, since (B′, r) satisfies ϕ(c), (B∗, r) |=
ϕ[b]. Also, by Axiom 1 we have for all a ∈ A, (A∗, q) |= ¬Qx(x = ca), so the sentences
¬(c = ca) are of type (c) and belong to Γ, hence they hold in (B′, r). It follows that b 6= a
for all a ∈ A, whence b ∈ B \ A. This shows that (B, r) satisfies conclusion (i) of the
lemma.
Now let ψ(y) be any formula of L∗(Q) such that (A∗, q) |= ¬Qyψ(y). Then ψ(y) is
ψn(yn) for some n ∈ ω and (ii) follows from the fact that (B′, r) omits Σn.
We can iterate the main lemma using elementary extensions to get the following
stronger result:
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Lemma 6.19. Let (A, q) be a countable weak model in which all the axioms of L(Q) hold, and let
L∗ be the language of A∗. Then (A, q) has a countable elementary extension (B, r) such that for
all formulas ϕ(x) of L∗(Q), (A∗, q) |= Qxϕ(x) if and only if there exists b ∈ B \ A such that
(B∗, r) |= ϕ[b].
Proof. Since the set A is countable, we may arrange all formulas of ϕ(x) of L∗(Q) such
that Qxϕ(x) holds in (A∗, q): ϕ0(x0), ϕ1(x1),... Then using the main lemma countably
many times we construct an elementary chain (An, qn)i∈ω such that:
(1) (A0, q0) = (A, q).
(2) There exists bn ∈ An+1 \ An such that (A∗n+1, qn+1) |= ϕn[bn], n < ω.
(3) For all formulas ψ(y) of L∗(Q) such that (A∗n, qn) |= ¬Qyψ(y), and all n < ω,
{a ∈ An+1 | (A∗n+1, qn+1) |= ψ[a]} ⊆ An.
Let (B, r) = ∪n<ω(An, qn). Then by Lemma 6.16, (B, r) is an elementary extension of
each (An, qn) and in particular of (A, q). Then it follows from (1)-(3) that (B, r) satisfies
the result.
We are now ready to prove the main result in this chapter:
Proof of the Completeness Theorem (Hard direction):
Suppose Σ is a consistent set of sentences of L(Q). By the weak completeness theorem, Σ
has a countable weak model (A0, q0) in which all the axioms of L(Q) hold. Now, iterating
Lemma 6.19 ω1 times and using Lemma 6.16 at the limit stages, we obtain an elementary
chain (Aα, qα)α<ω1 , of countable weak models such that:
(1) If α is a limit ordinal, (Aα, qα) = ∪β<α(Aβ, qβ).
(2) For any α < ω1 and any formula ϕ(x) of the language of (A∗α, qα),
(A∗α, qα) |= Qxϕ(x) iff for some a ∈ Aα+1 \ Aα, (A∗α+1, qα+1) |= ϕ[a].
Let B = ∪α<ω1Aα. We shall show that B is a standard model of Σ.
Consider the weak model (B, r) = ∪α<ω1(Aα, qα). Since (A0, q0) ≺ (B, r), (B, r) is a
weak model of Σ. Our goal is to prove the following:
(3) For all formulas ϕ(x1, ..., xn) of L(Q) and all b1, ..., bn ∈ B,
(B, r) |= ϕ[b1, ..., bn] iff B |= ϕ[b1, ..., bn].
We shall proceed by induction on ϕ. Since the clauses for the definition of satisfaction
of first-order formulas are the same for (B, r) as for B, the problem reduces to prove (3)
for ϕ = Qx0ψ(x0, ..., xn).
For some α < ω1, b1, ..., bn ∈ Aα. Suppose (B, r) |= Qx0ψ[b1, ..., bn]. Then (Bβ, qβ) |=
Qx0ψ[b1, ..., bn], α ≤ β < ω1. By (2), for every β such that α ≤ β < ω1, there exists aβ ∈
Aβ+1 \ Aβ with (Aβ+q, qβ+1) |= ψ[aβ, b1, ..., bn]. This means that (B, r) |= ψ[aβ, b1, ..., bn],
an since all the aβ are distinct and there are ω1 of them, the set S = {b0 ∈ B | (B, r) |=
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ψ[b0, ..., bn]} has power ω1. But since ψ satisfies (3), the set S is the same as {b0 ∈ B |B |=
ψ[b0, ..., bn]}, and therefore B |= Qx0ψ[b1, ..., bn].
Now suppose that (B, r) |= ¬Qx0ψ[b1, ..., bn]. Hence whenever α ≤ β < ω1, (Aβ, qβ) |=
¬Qx0ψ[b1, ..., bn]. It follows from (1) and (2) that S = {b0 ∈ B | (B, r) |= ψ[b0, ..., bn]} ⊆ Aα.
But since Aα is countable, by induction hypothesis we conclude that B |= ¬Qx0ψ[b1, ..., bn].
This completes the proof.
Since Σ ` ϕ iff there is a finite Σ0 ⊆ Σ such that Σ0 ` ϕ (proofs are finite), Σ is
consistent iff all finite Σ0 are consistent. Now using the Completeness theorem:
Corollary 6.20. L(Q) is countably compact.
Compactness theorem does not hold if L has uncountably many constants: if we con-
sider the set of sentences Σ = {¬QxP(x)} ∪ {P(cα) | α < ω1} ∪ {¬cα = cβ | α < β < ω1},
it is easy to check that every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable but Σ is not. This means that
L(Q) is just countably compact.
The first fully compact extension of first-order logic was given by Shelah (1975) in his




Model theorists lost interest in abstract model theory by the early 1990s. The main
reason for this was that they were not successful in providing characterization theorems
for the variety of extensions they were studying. Maybe because of that, Lindström’s
theorems remain an oddity in the universe of model theory and are often overlooked. They
do, however, give very valuable information about the limitations of our formal systems
and, by extension, about our mathematical practice. For that reason, they will have a
permanent place in the history of mathematics. Furthermore, all the new techniques
developed in the study of extended logics (of which the proof of Keisler’s Completeness
theorem for L(Q1) is a great example) have greatly enriched the model-theoretic toolbox.
We hope that we have been able to transmit this importance to the reader.
With respect to my personal experience, the task of writing this essay has demanded
a considerable mathematical maturity and I have faced some challenges for the first time:
dealing with an extense bibliography and putting together all my ideas was not a smooth
process. However, I am satisfied with the results, and especially with the fact that this
essay has opened the doors to a branch of mathematics that was completely unknown
for me one year ago. I would be pleased to continue studying more advanced results in
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